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The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, and the Methodology for assessing  
their implementation, seem to support those academic contributions which overcome  
the  classic  distinction  between  the  shareholders  primacy  and  the  stakeholders’  
models  of  companies;  they  also  appear  to  require  a  re-conceptualisation  of  the  
interests involved and not simply a model of company, but a model of the successful  
company. This paper proposes such a model, and asserts its validity from a property  
rights perspective and from a human rights perspective. It subsequently argues that  
shaping of a corporate governance framework based on this model would raise a key 
challenge for company law legislators and for the broader regulatory agenda, and  
that satisfactory responses to this challenge – for which some first hypothesis are  
proposed - would be fully compatible with the increasingly global corporate social  
responsibility concern,  while opening new themes for academic research and for  
decision-makers choices.   
Introduction
   The corporate collapses which have taken place in the USA and within the EU in 
the recent years (2001-2004), and their disastrous consequences, have been generating 
far-reaching effects at governmental level and at an academic level. 
  On the one hand, the corporate collapses have brought corporate governance at the 
top of the reform agenda of Governments all over the world. Not surprisingly, the 
aftermath of these collapses, the OECD published in 2004 a revised version of its 
Principles of Corporate Governance, first published in 1999 and which represent “a 
common basis that OECD member countries consider essential for the development 
of  good  corporate  practices”,  and  issued  in  December  2006  a  “Methodology  for 
assessing  the  implementation  of  the  OECD  Principle  of  Corporate  Governance” 
(hereinafter: the Methodology). These Principles evidence, as the overriding concern 
that should guide the development of the corporate governance framework,  its impact 
on  overall  economic  performance,  irrespective  of  the  legal  environment  in  which 
companies  operate  (common law or  civil  law)  and irrespective  of  the  company’s 
ownership structure.  
   On the other hand, these collapses have been generating a twofold consequence on 
the academic literature, in particular on the Anglo-American literature: a significant 
part  of  contributions  have  been  increasingly  calling  into  discussion  the  classic 
distinction between the ‘shareholder model’ (whereby companies are to be run in the 
interest of the shareholders)  and the ‘stakeholders model’ (whereby companies are to 
be  run  also  in  the  interest  of  other  constituency  groups)  and  proposing  new 
frameworks for understanding corporations, whereas another part of this literature has 
been  either  reaffirming  its  adherence  to  a  shareholders-centred  view of  corporate 
governance or proposing minor variations to the shareholders primacy approach. The 
two  approaches,  in  turn,  rely  on  different  theories  of  the  firm,  i.e.  on  different 
theoretical frameworks for understanding companies and their operation.    
    In this context, some broad questions, subsequent to each others, emerge: 
   a) which one, amongst the two approaches that can be identified in the literature, 
can be regarded as the most appropriate one in light of the revised OECD Principles 
and of the Methodology ? In other words, can there really be a difference in terms of 
the interests to be promoted by company’s directors in the fulfilment of their duties, 
between the so-called “shareholder model” and the so-called “stakeholder model”, if  
paying the necessary attention to the overall economic performance which the OECD 
Principles in the revised version indicate as the ultimate goal ? 
  b)  in case of a negative response, is there the scope for a “theory of the successful 
firm” rather than simply for a “theory of the firm”, and shouldn’t a model of corporate 
governance based on this theory be regarded as the one best capable of achieving the 
outcomes  indicated  by  the  OECD Principles  and  thus  more  consistent  with  these 
Principles ? 
 c)  if  so,  could  this  model  of  the  successful  firm  be  supported  from  the  two 
perspectives that appear to have drawn attention, in recent years, in the literature on 
the  nature  and  on  the  operation  of  companies,  namely  from  the  property  rights 
perspective and from the human rights perspective, and how could this model inspire 
a corporate governance framework ?
    The article, which attempts at offering a response to these questions, is structured in 
three Sections. Section 1, after briefly summarising the state-of-art in the legal and 
management-oriented literature,  argues  that  the aspects  highlighted by the various 
positions  criticising  the  usefulness  of  the  distinction  between  shareholders  and 
stakeholders  theory  are  complementary  to  each  others.  Section  2  aims  at 
demonstrating that,  although the  OECD Principles  are  intended to  encompass  the 
different models that exist, the best achievement of their objectives would imply a 
framework  based  not  on  the  classic  models,  but  on  a  different  understanding  of 
company’s  activities  which  would  need  to  be  build  up  on  the  complementarities 
between the positions that criticise  the classic theoretical  distinction.  Accordingly, 
Section 3 proposes such an understanding,  develops it into a “refined theory of the 
successful firm”, tests the model from a property rights perspective and from a human 
rights  perspective;  the  Section  formulates,  eventually,  hypothesis  for  a  corporate 
governance framework inspired by this model. Lastly, some final remarks intend to 
present the implications that the model proposed could have on future research and 
debates.
   
1. The  current state of art in the recent academic literature: overview  
1.1.  Overview of  the recent  positions criticising the shareholders vs.  stakeholders  
alternative
      Good part of the academic literature, both before and after the corporate collapses, 
has been submitting that corporate governance practices throughout the world have 
been profoundly affected by the recent dominance of a shareholder-centred ideology 
of  corporate  law  among  the  businesses,  governments,  and  legal  elites  in  key 
commercial jurisdictions, and that the resulting convergence is marking the “end of 
the  history”  for  company  law  and,  ultimately,  for  corporate  governance  related 
debates1. This “history”, in the form it has been assuming over a long period of debate 
at  an  academic  and  legislatures’  level,  is  to  be  intended  as  (international) 
contraposition between alternative and competing views about the role of companies, 
the interests to be pursued by directors and their accountability in fulfilment of their 
duties. On the one hand, the “shareholders’ model” which affirms that companies are 
to  be  run  in  the  interests  of  shareholders  and  directors  are  accountable  only  to 
shareholders,  although  it  recognises  that,  in  order  to  promote  the  interests  of 
shareholders, it is necessary to effectively manage to relationships with stakeholders2. 
On the other hand, the ‘stakeholders’ model according to which the interests to be 
pursued include not only those of shareholders but also those of employees, clients, 
suppliers  and  in  general  the  wider  community  which  is  generally  referred  to  as 
“stakeholders”.  As  the  enhancement  of  shareholders  wealth  is,  at  present,  the 
overriding criterion in many countries, and the question is being raised what would be 
the criterion if shareholders wealth were not3, the “history” would seem at a first sight 
to  be  over.   After  the  collapses  in  recent  years,  one  of  the  strongest  positions 
advocating  the  shareholders  primacy  approach,  to  which  it  refers  to  as  ‘Anglo-
American’  system,  defended  this  model  with  even  greater  emphasis,  stating  that 
“what  Enron did show about  corporate governance,  was that the Anglo-American 
system works”4. This would be so, in such view, on the grounds that the standard to 
assess systems is their ability to reduce the frequency and severity of misdeeds, as 
well as their ability to detect and correct the problems that arise, and that Enron’s 
wrongdoing  was  in  fact  detected  by  the  market5,  where  companies  compete  for 
attracting  shareholders6.  This  conception,  which  refers  “corporate  governance” 
exclusively to “ways of ensuring that corporate actions, agents and assets are directed 
at achieving the corporate objectives established by the corporation’s shareholders”7, 
stresses that corporations are the property of the shareholders in aggregate8 and that 
stakeholders  are  to  be  regarded  as  means  towards  the  ultimate  end  of  achieving 
shareholders’ goals9. 
     This kind of conceptions,  which lead to the prioritisation of shareholders’ interests 
over stakeholders’ interests, is in turn criticised by an increasing part of the Anglo- 
American literature which has, in recent years, attempted to shift the emphasis away 
from the classic shareholders vs. stakeholders alternative.
     On  the  one  hand,  this  literature  has  proposed  alternative  frameworks  for  
understanding corporations or called into discussions the asserted contrast between 
the  theoretical  frameworks  underpinning  the  shareholders  model  and  the  
stakeholders model.  The “shareholder primacy” approach, which relies on the “nexus 
of contracts” assumption that the shareholders are the sole residual claimants and risk 
bearer, and which holds that directors ought to be accountable only to shareholders for 
maximising their wealth,  has been convincingly criticised from both viewpoints. 
1 H.  Hansmann  &  R.  Kraakman,  “The  end  of  history  for  corporate  law”,  in  “Convergence  and 
persistence in corporate governance”, ed. by J.N.Gordon and M.J.Roe, 2004, pp. 33-68
2 E.g., Hampbel Report 1998; the Hermes Principles 2002; the International Corporate Governance 
Network, ICGN Approach to OECD Principles, A Working Kit Statement of Corporate Governance 
Criteria, 1. Corporate Governance.
3 C. Mallin, Corporate Governance, 2004, Oxford University Press, at 50.
4 E. Sternberg, Corporate Governance, Accountability in the Marketplace, IEA, 2nd edition, 2004, at 
17. 
5 Id.
6 Id, p. 178.
7 Id, p. 28
8 Id, p. 29.
9 Id, p. 30
    One kind of criticism highlights that other categories of constituencies, such as 
employees and creditors, also bear significant residual risk, and it proposes a ‘team 
production’  approach  for  understanding  the  role  of  directors  and  the  nature  of 
corporations10 . This approach argues that,  whenever a group of individuals agree to 
work together on a complex production task, the difficulty of agreeing in advance 
what everyone is supposed to contribute and can expect to get out of the joint effort 
gives  rise  to  a  “team production”  problem:  each  team member  will  make  ‘firm-
specific’  investments  in  the  joint  enterprise  in  terms  of  time,  ideas,  efforts,  and 
money, by performing non separable tasks, and these investments may be sunk in the 
business and not recoverable except by carrying out the enterprise and sharing the 
income it generates.  Because this commitment of resources – the reasoning follows – 
makes each team member vulnerable to rent-seeking on the part of others, who could 
try to get a larger share of the proceeds deriving from the joint effort, an institutional 
arrangement such as the incorporation facilitates cooperation among team members 
and provide a unique solution to the contracting problems in team production.  In this 
conception, the corporation, as a legal person with its own rights, is not the property 
of the shareholders, but is separated from each of the participants; the participants, by 
forming a corporation and selecting directors, avoid the problems of contracting with 
each others and agree to give up control rights over their firm-specific investments 
and over the output from the joint enterprise to directors, who are given the legal 
responsibility  to  act  for  the corporation and who,  for  this  purpose,  must  act  as a 
“mediating hierarchs”. In this capacity, directors’ role is to settle any dispute that may 
arise  amongst  team members  over  enterprise  strategy  or  over  the  division  of  the 
enterprise proceeds; in turn, to fulfil this role and ensure the long term health and 
prosperity  of  the  enterprise,  the  board  of  directors  must  be  viewed  as  fair  and 
trustworthy  by  all  team  members.  The  board  trustworthiness  thus  makes  the 
corporation the mechanism for fostering, amongst the participants in a vast business 
enterprise – shareholders, managers, employees – the trust that is essential in order for 
the team production to continue. Directors are thus conceived as “fiduciaries” of the 
corporation, with a task of balancing interests, and not as “agents” of the shareholders 
(with a task of ranking interests) as in the shareholders primacy approach, and their 
incentive to act as a trustworthy mediating hierarchs would need to be provided by a 
framework of social norms that value trustworthiness and mutual reliability.    
    This team production approach, which was proposed both as a framework for 
understanding corporations and as an explanation of some features of US corporate 
law that largely insulate directors from shareholders influence, effectively manages to 
explain the downsides in the relationships between “team members”, and in directors’ 
poor  performance in their  role,  that  led to corporate  collapses such as Enron and 
WorldCom,  and it also puts forward a satisfactory criticism of the key assumption - 
shareholders  as  the  only  risk-bearer  and  residual  claimants  -  underlying  the 
shareholders  primacy  approach.  Nonetheless,  it  has  been  in  turn  criticised  by  a 
literature  which  has  proposed  a  partly  different  model:  a  “directors’  primacy 
approach”11 . In this model, which expressly aims at providing responses to the two 
questions concerning who controls corporations (“means of corporate governance”) 
and whose interests should prevail when decision-making is presenting with a zero-
10 M. Blair and L. A. Stouts, A Team production theory of corporate law, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 
85,  No.  2,  March  1999,  pp.  248-328;  M.Blair,  Shareholder  Value,  Corporate  Governance  and 
Corporate Performance, A Post-Enron Reassessment of the Convention Wisdom, 2002, pp 53-73
11 S. M. Bainbridge; Director primacy: the means and ends of corporate governance, Northwestern 
University Law Review, Winter 2003
sum game (“ends of corporate governance”), the firm is not a nexus of contracts, but 
has a nexus of contracts with agents which are hired by a central decision-making 
body, the board of directors. Unlike the shareholder primacy approach, the board of 
directors  would not  generally  be hired by shareholders,  but  would hire  factors  of 
productions,  amongst which investors and thus shareholders;  however,  in order to 
successfully hire shareholders, the board of directors needs to commit themselves to 
maximise  shareholders  wealth,  as  shareholders  would  be  the  most  vulnerable 
corporate  constituency and the  interests  of  other  stakeholders  would  be  protected 
either  by  contract  or  by  the  law.  The  critics  this  model  addresses  to  the  team 
production model consists, on the one hand, in its conception of the role of directors – 
which  are  regarded  as  a  central  fiat  authority  hiring  and  coordinating  factors  of 
production rather than a mediating hierarchy -, and, on the other hand, in the claim 
that  in  large  corporations  the  tasks  carried  out  by  employees,  managers  etc..  are 
separable, so that the corporation could not be seen as a production team, but, at most, 
as a set of separable teams. The directors primacy model thus asserts, as regards the 
means of corporate governance, that the boards of directors controls corporation, and, 
as regards the ends,  that  shareholders interests  should be pursued;  it  also gives  a 
different explanation, from that offered by the team production approach, of some 
features of US corporate law. Irrespective of the validity of either the team production 
theory or the director primacy approach as an explanation of US corporate law, the 
directors’ primacy approach – although it differs from shareholders primacy as it puts 
forward a different framework explaining the relationships between shareholders and 
directors – shows a significant gap: it does not seem to fully demonstrate the reason 
why, in any circumstance, shareholders would be the most vulnerable constituency. 
     Another kind of criticism denies  the asserted contrast between the theoretical  
frameworks underpinning the shareholders model and the stakeholders model. In this 
regard, this criticism has extensively argued that theoretical frameworks that suggest 
company’s accountability only to their shareholders are not necessarily inconsistent 
with theoretical framework underlying stakeholder accountability, on the ground that 
“shareholders’  interests  can  only  be  satisfied  by  taking  into  account  stakeholders 
interests, as companies that are accountable to all of their stakeholders are over the 
long-term more successful and more prosperous”12.  This position has proposed the 
probably most “progressive” definition of corporate governance, as “the system of 
checks  and  balance,  both  internal  and  external  to  companies,  which  ensures  that 
companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activity”13, and, by relying on previous 
literature as well as on empirical research, has emphasized the business case for the 
adoption of a stakeholders-oriented approach as a winding road to long-term value 
creation14.      
     From the perspective of the yardstick which should guide the directors’ choices, 
other part of the literature has been rejecting what has been typically presented for 
decades as a  shareholders vs. stakeholders alternative. 
   One position15, even if it rejects the classic stakeholders’ model on the ground that, 
by avoiding to explain how to make the trade-off between competing interests, this 
model leaves managers unaccountable, recognises that no firm can maximise long-
12 J.Solomon, A.Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2004, at 
14.
13 Id.
14 Id., p. 28.
15 M.C.Jensen,  Vlue  Maximisation,  Stakeholder  Theory,  and  the  Corporate  Objective  Function, 
European Financial Management, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2001, 297-313, at 309-310.
term value if it ignores stakeholders’ interests, claims that no stakeholders could be 
given  full  satisfaction  if  a  balance  of  competing  interests  is  to  be  achieved,  and 
suggests  that  the  long-term increase  in  the  firms’  market  value  would  provide  a 
“balanced scorecard”, an objective parameter allowing managers to make the trade-
off between stakeholders’ competing claims. Another position, arguing that there is a 
tension between shareholders’ interests to profit maximisation and other social and 
environmental  concerns,  which  tension  may  undermine  company’s  performance, 
suggests that directors’ duties need to be reassessed and that the focus need not be 
whether  companies  are  to  be  managed  in  shareholders’  or  in  all  stakeholders’ 
interests,  but  how  directors  can  implement,  within  companies,  proper  systems  to 
manage the risks inherent in company’s activity in order to allow all concerned party 
to get the returns they are entitled by law from their contribution to the company16. 
1.2.  …..and  the  complementarity  between  the  various  positions  in  creating  the 
framework for a “refined theory of the successful firm” 
  
    Apparently, the above positions criticise the usefulness of the distinctions between 
the shareholders primacy approach and the stakeholder approach – and, in so doing, 
criticise the shareholder primacy on its own – on different grounds.
   Nevertheless, at a closer examination, it may be argued that the aspects dealt with 
by the different criticism are complementary to each others, in the sense that  they 
observe the same reality from the viewpoint of  the answers to different questions. 
Specifically: the criticism based on the circumstance that shareholders interests can 
only be satisfied by satisfying other stakeholders’ interests (Solomon: business case 
for  stakeholders  approach;  the  goal  of  creating  value  for  stakeholders  is  pro-
shareholder) answers the general question that needs to underlie shareholders model, 
i.e. this question:  how can long – term shareholders value be maximised or created. 
This  criticism also answers  another  question,  that  appears  to  be  neglected  by  the 
proponents  of  the  shareholders  primacy.  The  question  is  how  to  reconcile  the 
maximisation of shareholders value with the “internalisation” of the concerns of other 
stakeholders and of the wider community in the decision making, which is known as 
“Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR)17, and with the acknowledgment that “CSR 
makes business more competitive,  not  less”18.  The answer to this  second question 
comes from the realisation, which is put forward by the criticism under consideration, 
that the internalisation of the concerns of other stakeholders is “pro-shareholders”, i.e. 
that it helps shareholders’ value. The second and consequent question cannot but be 
why the  shareholders’  interests  can  only  be  satisfied  by  protecting  stakeholders’ 
16 J.Dine, Risks and Systems: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and the European Employee 
Consultation Structures ? in International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 299 to 313, Vol. 3 
Issue 2, 2001 
17 The  European  Commission,  in  its  Communications  -   COM(2001)366,  “Promoting  a  European 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility”, and COM(2002)347final, “A business contribution to 
Sustainable  Development”  and COM(2006)136final  “Implementing the  partnership  for  growth  and 
jobs:  making Europe a pole of excellence on corporate social responsibility” – defines CSR as “a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary base”;  the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) identifies CSR as “the continuing commitment by businesses to 
behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the 
workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large.” (WBCSD Report 
“Meeting  Expectations.  Corporate  Social  Responsibility”,  p.  3,  available  at  www.wbcsd.ch,  links 
“business role” and “corporate responsibility”).
18 As stated by the UK Government, see www.csr.gov.uk
interest, i.e. why CSR makes companies more competitive and more profitable.  The 
assertion that (as stated by the team production model)19 if  stakeholder categories 
such  as  employees  feel  that  they  can  regard  directors  as  a  reliable  mediating  
hierarchy capable of ensuring that their interests be safeguarded and not subject to 
shirking by others,  then  they make the firm-specific investments that  the company 
needs,  is  a  rational  response,  and  another  complementary  response  is  that,  if 
stakeholders  interests  are  safeguarded,  the  risk  inherent  on  the  company20 is 
successfully  managed.   As  a  result  of  all  this,  the  long –  term market  value21 is 
maximised, and the entity’s wealth is also so. The third question, that follows from 
accepting the answers to the first two questions, is: what do the responses imply for 
directors’ duties? The response come, again, from the basic outputs of these positions: 
directors, in their position of trustworthy hierarchy, should put in place appropriate 
systems  for  decision-making,  to  make  sure  that  the  risk  of  stakeholders’ 
dissatisfaction is minimised,  so that they continue to make the best  of their  firm-
specific investment, which allows the risk on the business activity to be minimised.
     It may be noted, however, that, having demonstrated that the various criticism are 
complementary to each other, a question has remained unresolved: the reason why 
some criticism are based on the  compatibility of interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders22 whereas other of these positions are based on the balancing of interests 
and thus, it seems, on the  contrast  between interests that have to be balanced23. A 
response can nevertheless be proposed for this issue, a response which relates directly 
on the  conceptualisation of the interests of the various stakeholders groups.   This 
response can be extrapolated from the revised OECD Principles, and, together with 
the  complementarities  between  the  various  criticism  to  the  distinction  between 
stakeholders and shareholders models, it can provide a key feature in developing a 
conceptual model tailored to a framework that would best allow the achievement of 
the objectives laid down by the OECD Principles.        
2.   The  OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
2.1. The OECD Principles and Methodology: a plausible reading of the concepts of  
stakeholders and of success of the company……
   If the latest (2004) version of the Principles is compared with the previous (1999) 
one, it can be submitted that, despite  prima facie similarities in most of the overall 
document, the differences that exist between the two texts make it possible to propose 
a reading of the 2004 version such as to deprive of any theoretical and practical scope 
the debate, which has been going on for decades, as regards the question whether 
companies should be run solely in the interest of shareholders or in the interest of 
other constituencies too. This because, as it will be argued below, from the text of the 
2004 version – and from its differences in comparison with the 1999 version – it is 
possible to extrapolate specific concepts about the “stakeholders” and the “success of 
19 Blair and Stout, supra, n. 10.
20 Dine, supra n. 16.
21 Jensen, supra n. 15.
22 These are, in essence, the positions of  J.Solomon, A.Solomon, cit.; R.E.Freeman, A.C. Wicks, B. 
Parmar, Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective Revisited”, in Organisation Science, Vol. 
15, No. 3, May-June 2004, pp. 364-369.  
23 This appears to be the case for the mediating hierarchy framework underlying the team production 
model by Blair and Stouts
the company”, even if this outcome was beyond the intentions of the drafters of the 
latest version24.
       The Preamble to the Principles, in the 2004 version as well as it did in the 
previous  one,  rejects  at  the  outset  any  claim  of  “superiority”  of  one  model  of 
corporate governance over another, by stating that there is no single model of good 
corporate governance25. However, whereas the Preamble to the 1999 version simply 
stated that the Principle were to serve as a “reference point”, the Preamble to the 2004 
version clarifies, in more specific terms,  the Principle’s aim is to identify objectives 
and suggest various  means for achieving them26.  This aim is  also reflected in the 
Methodology, which latter, in turn, places emphasis on “functional equivalence” by 
indicating that “there are many different ways, institutions, laws, etc...for achieving 
the outcomes” set by the Principles and that the Principles implementation needs to be 
adapted to national circumstances27. The adaptation to national circumstances does not 
imply, however, sacrificing the intended outcomes: the Methodology clearly explains 
that  the  criteria  to  assess  whether  a  principle  has  been  implemented  have  to  be 
selected in a way that implies a value judgment about the effectiveness and efficiency 
of current arrangements in terms of achieving the outcome. Furthermore, it specifies 
its  intention not  to rank countries against  each others,  but  to  “assess qualitatively 
countries against what they could and should achieve in relation to the Principles”28 . 
The fact that the 2004 version, together with the Methodology (and unlike the 1999 
version),  refers  to  objectives  to  be  achieved,  suggests  a  different  “value”  for  the 
statement (which was also contained in the 1999 version) that there is no single model 
of good corporate governance: from the 1999 version, the reader would have argued 
that there is no single good model because there are in any case common elements that 
underlie  good  corporate  governance  and  these  elements need  to  be  a  point  of 
reference; from the 2004 version, as supplemented by the Methodology, the reader 
can infer that there is no single good model because there are in any case  common 
objectives  to  be  achieved,  and  that  the  common  elements  of  good  corporate 
governance,  viewed  against  these  common  objectives,  are  only  minimal  means 
indicated  by  the  Principles.  In  other  words,  in  the  latest  version  the  “point  of 
reference” can be identified in the objectives, rather than in the elements on their own: 
the objectives can, in essence, be identified in the long-term success of the company 
and in transparent and efficient markets. 
      The possibility of reading in this way the latest version is confirmed by another 
difference in comparison with the 1999 version. The Principles, in both versions, are 
articulated in broad areas; however, whereas the 1999 version was articulated in five 
areas,  the  latest  version  contains  one  more  area,  which  can  be  attributed  key 
importance. The areas dealt with by the earlier version, which were “the rights of 
24 The drafting of the 2004 version was the result of a long negotiation process, during which most 
Governments of member countries adopted a “minimalist” approach as regards the revisions to the 
made to the 1999 version and only a  last  minute intervention by the French Government made it 
possible significant progress in the chapter devoted to stakeholders: see the report by the TUAC (Trade 
Union Advisory Committee) , The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, An Evaluation of the 
2004 Review by the TUAC Secretariat, October 2004, p. 11.  
25 “There is no single model of good corporate governance. However, work carried out in both OECD 
and non-OECD countries  and  within  the  Organisation  has  identified  some common elements  that 
underlie  good  corporate  governance.  The  Principles  build  on  these  common  elements  and  are 
formulated to embrace the different models that exist” (Preamble, p. 13).
26 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1999, Preamble, p. 3 and OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 2004, Preamble, p. 13. 
27 Methodology, p. 4
28 Id, p. 5.
shareholders”, “the equitable treatment of shareholders”, the “role of stakeholders”, 
“disclosure and transparency”, and “the responsibilities of the board” are also dealt 
with by the later version, but this latter, before  concentrating on these areas, focuses 
on a new concern, which is indicated as an area on its own: “ensuring the basis for an 
effective corporate governance framework”. In explaining in details the requirements 
for  an  effective  corporate  governance  framework,  the  new  version  clarifies  the 
ultimate  objective  when,  in  the  annotations  to  the  Principles,  it  states  that  policy 
makers should remain focussed on ultimate economic outcomes 29. The Methodology 
specifies that this means that policy makers should in essence ensure that the benefits 
of certain policy options outweigh the costs30. In turn, such an ultimate goal can be 
assumed to be the achieved to a greater extent the higher the degree to which certain 
policy options in shaping the corporate governance framework help ensuring the long-
term ‘success’ of the corporations in terms of competitiveness and profitability, as 
well as the transparency and efficiency of markets within which companies operate, 
and  which  can  thus  help  creating  the  framework  for  their  long-term  success. 
Consequently,  the  long term success  of  corporations  can be  seen as  the  essential 
component of the economic outcomes that, according to the Principles, should be the 
ultimate  concern  for  policy-makers  when  shaping  the  corporate  governance 
framework.  
      Exactly in light of the ultimate concern for the economic outcomes and of the 
Principles’ aim of identifying objectives, it can be argued that, in each areas, the new 
version indicates the objectives that need to be achieved by the corporate governance 
framework  in  order  to  ensure  the  ultimate  economic  outcome.   In  light  of  each 
Principle, a corporate governance framework should thus have the objectives of:
- promoting transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law 
and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, 
regulatory and enforcement authorities;
- protecting and facilitating the exercise of shareholders’ rights;
- ensuring  the  equitable  treatment  of  all  shareholders,  including  minority  and 
foreign shareholders, and providing them with the opportunity to obtain effective 
redress for violation of their rights;
- recognising  the  rights  of  stakeholders  established  by  law  or  through  mutual 
agreements  and  encouraging  active  co-operation  between  corporations  and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises;
- ensuring  that  timely  and  accurate  disclosure  is  made  on  all  material  matters 
regarding  the  corporation,  including  the  financial  situation,  performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company;
- ensuring  the  strategic  guidance  of  the  company,  the  effective  monitoring  of 
management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders.
These objectives are listed as “overarching principles” and explained, in detail, by 
“individual principles” which indicate how each of the objectives should be achieved. 
The Methodology, in dealing with the objective of  “ensuring the strategic guidance of 
the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s 
29 Policy makers have a responsibility to put in place a framework that is flexible enough to meet the 
needs of corporations operating in widely different circumstances, facilitating their development of 
new opportunities to create value and to determine the most efficient deployment of resources. To 
achieve this goal, policy makers should remain focussed on ultimate economic outcomes
30 Methodology, p. 14
accountability to the company and the shareholders”, identifies one of the individual 
principles  as  the  most  important  of  the  Principles31.  According  to  this  individual 
principle, “Board members should act in a fully informed basis, in good faith, with 
due diligence and care and in the best interest of the company and its shareholders” 
and the Methodology states that, if this individual principles were fully implemented, 
there would be little need for other individual principles, as “a number of the other 
principles are intended to ensure that the principle is implemented as effectively as 
possible”. If these statements, which clarify that the principles are complementary to 
each  other,  are  considered  together  with  the  general  objectives  of  ensuring  the 
“board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders”  and of “encouraging 
active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders..”,   a  first  reading may 
suggest that the company’s interests and the shareholders’ interests are regarded as 
deserving priority over the stakeholders interests: this in light of the accountability to 
the company on the one hand, and of the co-operation with stakeholders on the other 
hand.  Nevertheless,  the  Annotations  complementing  the  Principles,  and  the 
Methodology, give the lie to this interpretation.  
    On the one hand, the Methodology, while it states that the judgment about whether 
the  objective  of  ensuring  the  strategic  guidance  of  the  company,  the  effective 
monitoring of management and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders is achieved should be based particularly on the judgment whether the 
Principles  concerning  shareholders  rights,  transparency  and  disclosure  are 
implemented, clarifies that a favourable assessment about the implementation of the 
principles concerning shareholders rights and transparency should be viewed “more in 
the way of  a  necessary  though  not  sufficient condition  for  implementation  of  the 
principles” at issue. On the other hand, the Principles state inter alia that the board 
should take into account  the interest  of  stakeholders32.  The Methodology,  in  turn, 
clarifies that, in discharging its accountability to the company and to its shareholders 
and in acting in their best interest, the board is expected to take due regard of, and 
deal fairly with, other stakeholders’ interests33.  The meaning of the expressions “take 
into account”, “take due regard of” and “deal fairly with” the interests of stakeholders, 
in the context of the Principles, of their annotations and of the Methodology, can be 
deduced from the Annotations to these Principles, when these Annotations state that34: 
“Corporate governance is concerned with  finding ways to encourage the various stakeholders in the  
firm  to  undertake  economically  optimal  levels  of  investment  in  firm-specific  human  and  physical  
capital. The competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of  a teamwork that  
embodies contributions from a range of different resource providers including investors, employees,  
creditors and suppliers. Corporations should recognise that the contributions of stakeholders constitute 
a valuable resource for building competitive and profitable companies. It is, therefore, in the long-term 
interest of corporations to foster wealth-creating co-operation among stakeholders. The governance 
framework  should  recognise  that  the interests  of  the  corporation  are  served  by  recognising  the 
interests of stakeholders and their contribution to the long-term success of the corporation”. 
    Although these statements were, in a similar language, also contained in the 1999 
version,  in the 2004 version they can be read in light of the ultimate objective lying in 
the economic outcomes of which the long-term success of the company is the essential 
component. From this perspective,  the proper meaning of the expressions “take into 
account”, “take due regard of” and “deal fairly with” the interests of stakeholders 
31 Methodology, p. 66. 
32 Principles, p. 24
33 Methodology, p. 65-66
34 Principles, Annotations, p  46.
(which are intended in the Principles, in their Annotations and in the Methodology, as 
interchangeable amongst them) can be identified in the protection of  the interests of 
stakeholders. This is because, without the  protection  of the interest of stakeholders, 
the meaning of the recognition of these interests would become difficult to identify if  
one  accepts  that  there  needs  to  be  a  wealth-creating  cooperation  among  all  
constituency  groups:  a  recognition  of  the  interests  of  stakeholders  without  the 
protection  of  these  interests  would,  inevitably,  imply  a  confrontation  between 
supposedly  different  interests,  rather  than  the  cooperation which  is  indicating  as 
wealth-creating and which is regarded at the root of the contributions of stakeholders. 
Consequently, the board’s  accountability to the company  can be seen, inter alia, as 
consisting  of  the  board’s  accountability  for  the  safeguard  of  the  interests  of  all  
stakeholders, which means, ultimately, board’s accountability for the maintaining of  
the contributions  that  all  stakeholders groups  give  to  the  competitiveness  and the 
profitability of the company, or, in other words, it means board’s accountability for 
achieving the ultimate economic outcomes which would not  be attainable without 
stakeholders’ contributions.    
      If this is considered together with the key individual principle - whereby “Board 
members should act in a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and 
care and in  the best  interest  of  the company and its shareholders” - and with the 
Methodology’s statement that a number of other principles are intended to ensure the 
implementation of this principle, it can be argued not only that the various principles 
are  complementary to  each other,  but  also  that  two conditions  are  necessary and 
sufficient for the achievement of the objectives concerning board’s responsibility: the 
implementation  of  the  principles  on  shareholders’  rights  and  disclosure,  and  the 
protection of stakeholders interests.   In  other words,  it  can be argued that,  in  the 
Principles in general,  and in  the key individual  principle  in  particular,  although a 
separate mention of a board’s responsibility to “act in the interest of stakeholders” 
cannot be found, the ultimate objective lying in the economic outcomes -  laid down 
by the 2004 version - implies that this responsibility is implicit in the duty to act “in 
the best interest of the company”.  
       The protection of stakeholders interests should not meet exceptions, just because 
the  interests  of  the  corporation  itself  are  regarded  as  served  by  recognising  the 
interests of stakeholders. As noted above, this protection is seen as resulting from the 
co-operation amongst stakeholders (and,  therefore,  between shareholders and other 
stakeholders group) which is considered as mutually beneficial (wealth-creating) and 
as a winding road to the interests of the corporation, where these interests, ultimately, 
are indicated in its “long-term success”35.  No co-operation between shareholders and 
other stakeholders would however be possible without the disclosure, by companies, 
of  details  on  issues  concerning  other  stakeholders,  which  disclosure  allows  other 
stakeholders  to  assess  the  benefit  derived  from the  co-operation:  accordingly,  the 
Methodology recognises that a judgment about whether the interests of stakeholders 
have  been  taken  into  account  should  rely  on  the  judgment  formed  about  this 
disclosure.  
    In turn, the interest of the company identified in the long-term success, and the 
underlying  long-term perspective, presupposes as a first condition the survival and 
development over time of the business activity run by the corporation, and requires, in 
consequence, that this activity be provided over time with the resources it needs for 
this survival and development. The category of stakeholders – whose definition has 
been the object of debate in the literature – is being identified by the Methodology in 
35 Principles, Annotations, p. 46
those who provide these resources, and who have the obvious and common interest in 
this survival and development of the business activity, which allows them to get the 
rewards; in fact, the Methodology states that: “the concept of stakeholders refers to 
resource providers to the corporation, including employees, creditors and suppliers”36. 
   Although it may be argued that this statement and the required focus on economic 
outcomes, on their own, do not imply a preference for the stakeholder theory -  for 
this preference would not justify the preliminary observation (in the Preamble) that 
there is no single good model of corporate governance - they appear to highlight two 
key  points,  one  regarding  the  concepts  of  “stakeholders”,  the  other  regarding  the 
“success of the company”. 
     First,  the clarification, by the Methodology, of the concept of stakeholders as 
resources providers, should be read together with the statement, in the Principles, that 
“boards are expected to take due regard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder 
interests  including  those  of  employees,  creditors,  customers,  suppliers  and  local 
communities”37, and with the definition of corporate governance according to which 
this involves “a set of relationships between the company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders”. If all this is read together, it may be deduced 
that, according to the text of the Principles and the Methodology, the category of other 
stakeholders includes – in addition to employees, creditors and suppliers - customers 
and local communities  to the extent that these groups also provide resources to the  
company and thus expect benefits from this provision.  It also suggests that the groups 
that can be classified as stakeholders not only need to have a relationship with the 
company -  which can be deduced from the definition of corporate governance – but 
this  relationship needs to  characterised by a  specific  quality,  i.e.  the provision of 
resources to the company. Interestingly, whereas the groups of employees, creditors 
and suppliers are always included within the category of stakeholders by both the 
Methodology and the Principles, the groups of customers and local communities are 
not indicated in the Methodology, and this difference, as it will be shown, makes it 
possible to infer that only if they have a stable relationship with the company these 
groups can be assumed to be resources providers.
   Second,  as regards the success of the company,  it becomes apparent from the 
above indicated concepts of board’s accountability and of stakeholders that, from the 
Principles, a concept of “success” can be extrapolated: a company is successful when 
managing  to secure, over time, the contributions of  stakeholders under conditions  
ensuring the persistent satisfaction of all stakeholders’ interests, i.e. under conditions  
that make it possible the wealth-creating cooperation among all stakeholders groups  
and, as a result, the profitability and competitiveness of the company. Arguably, the 
profitability of the company is thus to be intended, in the context of the Principles, as 
related to a quality of the profit obtaining year by year by the company, rather than as 
a  maximisation  of  shareholders’  wealth  unrelated  to  other  circumstances.  This 
interpretation appears to be plausible due to both the way in which the ultimate goal 
of a corporate governance framework is presented and other statements contained in 
the  principles  concerning  stakeholders’  role,  the  responsibility  of  the  board  and 
disclosure and transparency.  
     As  said  above,  the  ultimate  goal  that  the  Principles  assign  to  a  corporate 
governance  framework,  the  economic  outcomes,  is  mentioned  within  the  first 
principle,  concerning the basis for an effective corporate governance framework38, 
36 Methodology, p.  45
37 Principles, p. 58
38 Principles, p. 30
and again within the principle concerning the role of stakeholders, under the terms 
“financially sound enterprises” and “profitability of the company” (and thus economic 
outcome of  the  company),  but  not  within  the  principles  concerning  the  rights  of 
shareholders. It can thus be deduced that an overriding concern for the maximisation 
of  shareholders’  personal  wealth  on  its  own  cannot  be  extrapolated  from  the 
principles. 
     An additional and important indication can be drawn if several other statements are 
considered all together.  The statements at issue are the disclosure principles whereby 
the company should disclose the operating and financial results, their policies relating 
to business ethics, the environment and other public policy commitments39 as well as 
key issues relevant to employees and other stakeholders that may materially affect the 
performance of the company40,  the statements whereby  “The shareholding body is 
made up of individuals and institutions whose interests, goals, investment horizons 
and  capabilities  vary”41;  “Together  with  guiding  corporate  strategy,  the  board  is 
chiefly responsible for monitoring managerial performance and achieving an adequate 
return  for  shareholders,  while  preventing  conflicts  of  interest  and  balancing 
competing demands on the corporation”  42; “High ethical standards are in the long-
term interests of the company as a means to make it credible and trustworthy, not only 
in day-to-day operations but also with respect to longer term commitments”43, and the 
statement according to which  “it is in the long – term interest of the corporation to 
foster wealth – creating co-operation among stakeholders”.
    All these statements, taken together,  highlight the importance of both the source 
and the manner in which the profit is obtained. With regard to the source, the need to 
disclose the operating profit indicates the importance of the profit obtained from the 
ordinary activity. As regards the manner in which the (operating) profit is obtained, 
the fact that:
a) there  are  “different  interests,  goals,  investment  horizons  and  capabilities” 
amongst shareholders, which evidently originate competing demands that have 
to be balanced while, at the same time, an adequate return must be secured to 
all shareholders, and
b) the interests of other stakeholders also need to be safeguarded to ensure their 
contributions, 
indicates that  there can be only one  appropriate manner in which the (operating) 
profit  can  be  obtained  while  maintaining  the  co-operation  amongst  all  various 
(shareholders  and)  stakeholders  groups,  and  in  which,  thus,  the  success  of  the 
company can be measured and its long-term interest satisfied. This manner lies in the 
ability  of  considering  what  are  commonly  regarded  as  competing  interests  as 
competing only in appearance, i.e. in the ability of identifying and giving priority to 
what  can  unite  the  apparently  different  interests  over  what  can  divide them.   If 
accepting that what can unite the apparently different interests is the  desire to get  
benefits from the  various  commitments  to  the  company’s  activity,  and  that  these 
benefits suppose the survival and development of the company (i.e., its “long-term” 
success),  competing demands to be balanced can be seen as conceptually different 
from  contrasting interests.  Specifically, competing demands can be simply seen as 
demands which came out at the same time from different individuals or groups for 
39 Principles, Annotations, p. 50, disclosure and transparency.
40 Principles, Annotations, p. 53.
41 Principles, p. 32, the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions.
42 Principles, p. 58, the responsibilities of the board.
43 Principles, p. 60, the responsibilities of the board.
rewards or benefits that are all being made possible by the satisfaction of the same,  
ultimate and common interest,  whereas contrasting interests, properly understood in 
the context of the statements contained in the Principles, can be regarded as interests  
contrary to the survival and development of the company and leading to request for,  
or courses of action, that could compromise this survival and development. Examples 
of contrasting interests can be found  in the interests leading to misuse of assets and to 
other types of conduct – self dealing, etc.. – indicated by the Principles, which would 
damage the business’ activity. 
   In turn, the ability of preventing contrasting interests, and  of attributing priority  
exactly to the ultimate and common interest in each choice regarding the satisfaction  
of the competing demands, emerges as the key feature in the success of the company, 
from the Principles.  This component  of  success of  the company appears to  make 
“obsolete” the traditionally opposite models of corporate governance, and to require a 
conceptual framework tailored to the best achievement of the objective set out in the 
Principles. This is because, as submitted above, in the 2004 version of these Principles 
the  point  of  reference  can  be  identified  in  the  objective  itself,  rather  than  in  the 
common elements of good corporate governance which are indicated by the Principles 
as a minimal means towards those objectives.
    
2.2….and the need for a conceptual framework geared to the best achievement of the  
objectives set by the Principles
    If the different positions existing in the academic literature – i.e., the positions 
criticising the theoretical distinction between shareholders primacy and stakeholder 
theory, and the positions insisting on shareholders primacy – are now considered in 
light  of  the  above  arguments  that  are  based  on  that  the  Principles  and  on  the 
Methodology, a first conclusion can be drawn, and a “gap” existing in the literature 
can be identified. 
     The first conclusion is that the Principles and the Methodology can be seen as 
“supporting” the positions criticising the theoretical distinction between shareholders 
primacy and stakeholder theory.     
     In effect, it can be easily noted that the objective advocated by the shareholder 
primacy  approach,  i.e.  the  maximisation  of  shareholders’  wealth,  and  the  related 
conception whereby the interests of stakeholders are to be taken into account only to 
the extent  that they serve to  achieve this  objective,  so that  they would be only a 
means towards the  end,  are directly called into discussion. It appears sufficient to 
remember that the Annotations  indicate the responsibility of the board in obtaining an 
adequate  return for  shareholders  rather  than  the maximum possible  return,  where 
adequate  return  is  evidently  to  be  read  as  the  economic  return  obtained  under 
conditions fostering the co-operation amongst all stakeholder groups and in following 
an ethical behaviour. In other words, “adequate return” appears to mean the need to 
obtain, year by year, a return consistent with the long-term perspective requiring the 
survival  and  development  of  the  business  activity,  which  would  not  be  possible 
without the resource providers, i.e. without the stakeholders. Because safeguarding 
stakeholders’ interests is always seen as necessary to achieve the long-term success of 
the business activity, it becomes evident that the conceptual distinction between the 
classic stakeholders theory and the shareholders primacy approach tends to disappear: 
if accepting that stakeholders’ interests need always to be safeguarded, it is no longer 
possible  to  find,  in  the  concrete  courses  of  action  to  be  undertaken,  a  difference 
between saying that stakeholders’ interests are a  means towards the success of the 
corporation  and  the  returns  to  shareholders  (to  use  the  conceptualisation  of 
shareholders primacy) and saying that stakeholders’ interests are an end in themselves 
(to  use  the  conceptualisation  typical  of  stakeholders  theory)  in  addition  to 
shareholders’ interests. The only difference may persist in the governance structures 
that may be more suitable to ensure that  – to satisfy both shareholders and other 
stakeholders interests – the ultimate and common concern lying in the survival and 
development of the business activity run by the corporation is given priority in each 
choice.  Whilst the disappearance of the reason to conceptualise in a different way 
shareholders and other stakeholders interests supports all the positions which  call into 
discussions the usefulness of the distinction between shareholders and stakeholders 
models, the identification of an ultimate and common concern lying in the survival 
and development of the business activity gives the right – within the ambit of this line 
of though – to those positions that advocate an objective yardstick44. The objective 
yardstick that emerges from the Principles and the Methodology, and that serves to 
assess whether the ultimate and common concern is  being satisfied,  can be easily 
drawn  from  the  principles,  when  they  stress  that  the  co-operation  amongst  all 
stakeholders serve to deliver financially sound enterprises and that companies need to 
disclose the  operating and financial results:   because the operating economic result 
indicates the profits coming from the company’s ordinary activity (“core business”) – 
which profit can be expected to be higher, the higher are the cooperation amongst all 
stakeholders group and the degree to which each group considers its needs as satisfied 
-  and  a  positive  economic  result  contributes  to  sound  financial  conditions,  the 
yardstick cannot but be given by the maintaining, year after year, of sound economic 
and financial conditions. This should guide directors’ strategic choices, and an open 
communication  with  all  stakeholders45,  upon  whom  the  business’  survival  and 
development depends, should ideally lie at the root of these choices. In consequence, 
taking into consideration the distinction between competing demands and contrasting  
interests,  the  recognition,  by  the  Annotations  to  the  principles,  that  within  the 
shareholders  group  investors  have  different  “interests,  goals,  time  horizons  and 
capabilities” can be seen as an expression only of competing demands - explained by 
the fact that different investors can have the same common interest for  a longer or 
shorter period of time - not  an expression of contrasting interests, and it does not give 
the lie to the yardstick above identified to assess whether the common interests on its 
own is being satisfied.  Well  before the publication of the Principles, a conceptual 
structure for characterising the interests involved in a company was proposed, and, 
according to this structure, the interests of each constituency involved in a company 
could be classified into two groups: a “derivative interest”, consisting in the interest in 
the  company’s  successful  pursuit  of  its  purpose,  which  is  shared  with  all  other 
constituencies;  a  “personal  interest”,  consisting  in  an  interest  in  maintaining  and 
furthering their personal position, which the company is not concerned to satisfy in 
order to achieve its purpose46, where the personal interest may at a time conflict with 
the  derivative  interest  and  where  the  interests  of  the  company  consists  of  the 
derivative interests of all affected parties47. With regard to this conceptual structure, 
44 Such as the minimisation of the risk incumbent on the company’s activity (Dine, 2001) and the 
increase in the long-term market value (Jensen, 2001): retro, par. 1, 1.1. and 1.2.
45 Which, in essence, was already regarded as necessary with a view to minimising the risks incumbent 
on the company (Dine, 2001)
46 S. Leader, Private Property and Corporate Governance, Part I: Defining the Interests, in  Perspectives 
on Company Law 1, Fiona Mc Millan, Patfield (eds), 1995, Kluwer Law International, 85 – 113, at 87- 
– 88.  
47 Id, at 88. 
the arguments above submitted suggest that, in light of the Principles, the “derivative 
interest”, the “interest of the company” and the “successful pursuit of its purpose” can 
all be re - conceptualised and summarised in the ultimate and common interests in the  
survival and development of the business activity under sound economic and financial  
conditions, whereas it can be argued that the category of “personal interests” would 
need to be re-conceptualised in terms of “competing demands”. The introduction of 
the long-term perspective,  and of the yardstick given by the sound economic and 
financial conditions generated by the co-operation amongst all stakeholders groups, 
needs  to  prevent  the  competing  demands  from  conflicting  with  the  ultimate  and 
common interests whose satisfaction makes possible for each of these demands to 
exist and to be satisfied in turn.  Whilst this realisation strengthens the fact that, in 
light  of  what  can  be  deduced  from  the  Principles,  the  positions  advocating  an 
objective yardstick to assess the fulfilment of directors duties represent the proper line 
of  thinking,  the  express  reference,  in  the  Annotations,  to  the  need  to  encourage 
stakeholders to undertake economically optimal levels of investment in firm-specific  
human and physical  capital   and to the success of a corporation as a result  of  a 
teamwork  that embodies contributions from a range of different resource providers 
including  investors,  employees,  creditors  and  suppliers,  suggests  that  the  team 
production model (Blair & Stout, 1999) can be regarded as  the proper conceptual  
framework  for understanding the  successful operation  of a company, and that this 
conceptual framework is complementary, for understanding the successful operation 
of a company, with the successful management, i.e. with the minimisation, of the risks 
incumbent on the company (Dine, 2001).        
   At  the same time, it  should be considered that  the team production model,  by 
referring  to  the  role  of  directors  as  mediating  hierarchs  that  prevent  each  team 
members from sharking, appears to suppose the existence of potentially conflicting 
interests amongst team members, and that it refers to creditors and employees. If this 
features of the team production model are red together with the arguments above 
extrapolated  from the  Principles  and  with  the  statement,  in  the  Annotations,  that 
“Corporate  governance  is  concerned  with  finding  ways  to  encourage  the  various  
stakeholders in the firm to undertake economically optimal levels of investment in  
firm-specific human and physical capital”,  an unresolved question emerges in the 
literature.  An  unresolved  question  emerges  because,  rather  than  to  potentially 
contrasting interests  amongst  team members,  the arguments extrapolated from the 
principles  refer  only  to  competing  demands  and  limit  the  notion  of  conflicting 
interests to interests contrary to the survival and development of the company, and the 
ultimate  and common interest  above  identified  refers  to  all  possible  stakeholders  
groups. In so doing, these arguments suppose that the groups that are not always listed 
within the category of stakeholders -  i.e, customers and local communities – are also 
induced to provide resources to the company,  which would turn them from groups 
that  may potentially  become stakeholders  into  current  stakeholders  that  share  the 
ultimate interest. The unresolved question that emerges is how can directors find the 
way  to  encourage  all the  possible  stakeholders,  including  the  categories such  as 
customers and local communities which are not always listed amongst the resource 
providers, to offer long-term contributions to the company, i.e. how can directors find 
the way to encourage all the possible stakeholders categories to provide optimal levels 
of investments in firm-specific (human and physical) resources in the broadest sense, 
with a view to secure the long-term success of the business activity.
    To  the  extent  that  the  team production  model  (by  referring  to  creditors  and 
employees) does not appear to answer directly this question, it  can be seen as the 
basic  conceptual structure which explains the operation of a company that may be 
successful,  and  which  may  be  at  the  basis  of  a  corporate  governance  framework 
capable  of  achieving the objectives  laid  down by the Principles.  Being it  a  basic 
conceptual structure, it  leaves space for a  complete  and thus  refined theory of the 
successful firm, based on an attempt at answering the question by means of a refined 
conceptual  structure  intended  to  offer  an  understanding  of  the  operation  of  a  
successful  business  activity  and  to  be  at  the  basis  of  a  corporate  governance 
framework capable of best achieving the objectives laid down by the Principles.
      An attempt at presenting such a conceptual structure is made in the next Section, 
which puts forward an “enlarged/enlightened team production model” or “model of 
the  successful  firm”.  However,  whereas  the  Principles,  the  annotations  and  the 
Methodology refer to publicly traded companies, thus to companies carrying on large 
scale commercial enterprises, the model presented in the next Section refers to all 
business activities, whether carried out by large or by smaller companies: this seems 
to be appropriate because a refined theory of the successful firm can, by including in 
its  scope  any  business  activity,  explain  how  whatever company  can  successfully 
growth  over  time and eventually  fall  within  the  category  of  companies  expressly 
covered by the Principles.   
3. Property and value of the corporation vs. property and value of the business 
activity  run  by  the  corporation:  the  key  distinction  and  the 
“enlarged/enlightened team production” approach or “result primacy” model
3.1. The “model of the successful firm”: the conception
     The view that the corporation is the property of shareholders in aggregate has been 
and is at the foundation of shareholders’ primacy theory. Nevertheless, it has been 
noted that, ultimately, shareholders only own a form of financial property, the shares, 
and that this form of financial property, which consist of rights to future income, owes 
its value  neither to their concrete properties as physical objects  nor to the value of 
tangible  assets  own by  the  company:  the  value  of  this  form of  property     “  is 
derived…from their  anticipated future earning power,  from a  capitalisation of  the 
dividends  which  are  expected  to  accrue  to  them  in  the  future”48.  The  fact  that 
shareholders are owners only of a form of financial property, and that this form of 
property  would  have  no  value  without  the  expected  future  dividends,  has  crucial 
importance  from a  twofold  viewpoint.  On the  one  hand,  from the  perspective  of 
shareholders – whose rights the shareholders primacy approach aims at promoting – it 
should shift the emphasis from the question “what is the corporation” to the question 
“what are the optimal conditions for the corporation to perform its business activity in 
such a way as to allow a regular flow of future income from the shares”. On the other 
hands, from the perspective of theoretical analysis, it reveals a basic confusion, in 
shareholders’  primacy  approach,  between  the  investment  in  the  capital  of  the 
corporation as a legal structure and the investment in the business activity run by the 
corporation.  With  regard  to  corporations  exercising  commercial  enterprise, 
particularly if large scale commercial enterprise, although shareholders, by definition, 
are  the  only  constituency  to  invest  in  securities  representing  the  capital  of  the 
corporation, they are not the only constituency to invest in the business activity run by 
48 P. Ireland, Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory, Legal Studies, 2003, 453 to 509, 
p. 493.
the  corporation:  the  team  production  model49 properly  stresses  that  employees, 
suppliers, creditors are other constituencies which make “firm-specific investments”, 
i.e.  investments  for  the  specific  firm and which  are  not  separable  from the  firm. 
Together with these constituencies, loyal customers who continue to buy over time 
the company’s products and services, to the extent that they do so based on a trust that 
they placed on the company upon initial satisfaction and that is not betrayed by the 
company, also commit themselves to the activity of the company, either consciously 
or unconsciously.  If the life process of any successful business activity is taken into 
consideration,  specific  phases  can  always  be  recognised:  the  start  up;  the  initial 
growth;  the  consolidation  in  the  national  and  international  market.  During  these 
phases, the legal form of business organisation typically changes (e.g., from private 
limited company to public limited company, from public company to listed public 
company),  and  the  contributions  of  any  stakeholder  category  which  commit 
themselves  to  the  business  with  a  long  term  perspective becomes  increasingly 
important.  Specifically,  except  for  those  cases  of  companies  enjoying  legal 
monopolies in the production and/or distribution of certain goods and services, three 
decisive factors can be recognised in the growth of any business activity (whatever 
the  jurisdiction  in  which  it  is  started  and  in  which  it  subsequently  expands  its 
operations):  a) the founders’ commitment of a  new or of an innovative “business 
idea” to the activity, with a view to launch it in the market and to reap the benefits 
arising  out  of  market’s  positive  reaction;  b) employees  and/  or  collaborators’ 
determination in working for and transmitting knowledge to the business activity, 
with a view to secure their role; c)  customers that, at the time when they appreciate 
the businesses’ products and/or services and continue to buy these for long periods, 
allow the “business reputation” or “brand name” to be established and to survive. 
These factors are interconnected to the point that they typically generate each others 
in a virtuous circle of causes and effects: customers’ initial reaction, if positive, leads 
to the first need for enlargement/structuring of the business organisation, which latter, 
by means of the recruitment of (the right) directors and employees, makes it possible 
a further expansion/consolidation in the market. The commitment of the founders, and 
that of directors and employees subsequently recruited, are necessary to each others in 
securing  the  consolidation  of  the  business’  position  in  the  market:  however,  no 
business can consolidate in the market without  customers’ durable satisfaction,  at a 
base of a lasting relationship.    
    Accordingly, though the founders/initial shareholders provide the “starting input”, 
the possibility for any business to survive, and to grow up to the point of becoming a 
publicly held company would be minimised – and the risk of failure or at least of 
failing in achieving growth would be maximised – if the business were based only on 
a series of short-term and occasional relationships. The situation would be that of a 
business activity with only occasional “una tantum” clients, and which do not manage 
to  retain  employees.   At  best,  such  a  business  remains  a  small  one,  where  the 
founders/shareholders have to combine the roles of capital provider and of workers 
even if they may lack the skills of doing everything. 
    It appears however reasonable to assume that individuals would like any source of 
satisfaction  –  as  far  as  possible  -  to  continue  over  time.  Company’s  employees 
satisfied  about  the  current  job  and  the  treatment  that  they  perceive,  as  well  as 
customers satisfied about the quality – or about the relationship between quality and 
price – of the products and services that they buy, are reasonably unlikely to seek 
alternatives at least in the short run; in other words, they are likely to be willing to 
49 Blair and Stouts, supra n. 10. 
ensure a long-term contribution to the life of the business activity. This is because, 
ultimately,  the  long-term  survival  and  development  of  the  business  ensures  the 
continuation of their own satisfaction.  Moreover, at least in the case of customers, 
they might make “good publicity” to the business, which may result in the acquisition 
of new customers.  Admittedly, in contemporary reality, where the corporate collapses 
at  the  start  of  this  new  millennium50,  together  with  earlier  cases  of  trading  in 
potentially  harmful  products51,  have  drawn  public  attention  on  the  conduct  of 
businesses  in  several  countries,  customers,  as  well  as  employees  and  other 
stakeholders, can reasonably be assumed to be increasingly “analytical” in collecting 
the information through which to assess their own satisfaction.  The more “analytical” 
the  various  categories  of  stakeholders  are,  the  more  they  may  find  alternatives: 
accordingly, in the current context of market’s globalisation, which entails increasing 
competition between companies on a global scale, the task of retaining e.g. employees 
(particularly the most qualified and skilled ones) and customers is deemed to become 
increasingly difficult. For this reason, the success in doing so – in other words, the 
success in ensuring on a lasting base the satisfaction of all these “critical” groups - 
ends  up  being  the  secure  “foundation”  for  maximising  the  chances  of  business’ 
prosperity over time.   
    The “rationale” that is commonly put forward, in the various theories of the firm, 
for the hiring of directors – that is, greater expertise, specialisation etc.. -  can thus be 
accepted,  but  one  more  reason  can  be  added:  the  skills  that  directors,  or,  more 
accurately, the rights directors, need to have to minimise the risk of business failure 
and to maximise the possibilities of business growth. This equals to turning what can 
be the initial relationships with clients or employees into long – term commitments of 
the various stakeholder categories, which, in turn, is possible to an higher extent the 
higher the degree to which these categories consider their own interests as protected 
by the choices made by directors. In other words, directors would need to regard any 
constituency  group  as  part  of  the  “team”  that  would  contribute  to  the  business’ 
activity growth. 
     This holds true not only for businesses in the growth stage, but also for large 
commercial companies, which need to maintain their market position. This market 
position would, in fact, be threatened – to the advantage of competitors – at the time 
when customers and/or employees become no longer satisfied.
    Such a conception of the firm would suit well with the notion of CSR, which – in 
the widely accepted definitions - requires business to internalise the concerns of the 
wider community in their decision-making52. Implicitly, the academic contributions 
that emphasize the “business case” for CSR, by stressing that socially responsible 
companies are also more successful in the long run, already indicate a theory of the 
successful firm, and support this theory through some empirical evidence53.  The same 
theory, in essence, is put forward by the literature which has submitted, again with 
empirical support,   that firms are rewarded, in terms of market value, if they take 
economic  as  well  as  environmental  and  social  concerns  into  their  development 
strategies54, and in particular by the stakeholders view of the corporation which has 
50 Such as the Enron collapse (2001) and the Parmalat scandal (2004)
51 Such as the notorious “mad cow”  case of trading in dangerous meat (revealed in 1996) which 
attracted much public concern.
52 See retro, part 1, 1.2.  
53 J.Solomon, A.Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability, J. Wiley &Sons Ltd, 2004, at 28-
29 and 192-196. 
54 S-Fang Lo and H.-Jiun Sheu, Is Corporate Sustainability a Value-Increasing Strategy for Business ? 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Volume 15 Number 2, March 2007, p. 345-356, at 
highlighted the importance of those “relational assets” created by stable relationships 
(based on mutual trust)  with critical  stakeholders in increasing the “organizational 
wealth” of  the corporation,  defined as the capacity  to  create value over the long-
term55.  This  stakeholder  view has also been supported by case studies  concerning 
three major international companies56.
   The theory of the successful firm underlying this literature is, in this work, “refined” 
by means of a suggestion of  how it could be possible to internalise all stakeholders 
concern and obtain the long-term commitments of all stakeholders groups (although 
in various forms depending on the group type) which are at the basis of the long-term 
success of the company.     
    As previously indicated,  the conceptual  framework of directors  as “mediating 
hierarchy”, at the basis of the team production model57, holds that directors are in the 
role  of  mediators  amongst  members of  the team – which,  in  that  conception,  are 
shareholders,  managers  and  employees  -  to  prevent  each  of  them from behaving 
opportunistically in such a way as to damage the team on the whole,  and ultimately to 
compromise its survival. In light of the distinction, that was extrapolated from the 
Principles in the previous part, between competing demands and contrasting interests, 
and  also  in  light  of  the  ultimate  and  common  interest  for  the  survival  and 
development of the business activity that, in the interest of the long-term success of  
the  company,  should  be  shared  also  by  customers  and  local  communities,   two 
adaptations can be made to the conception of the role of directors. One adaptation 
would need to be on the “membership” of the team: here, the team conception can be 
adapted to include, in additions to shareholders, managers and employees, all other 
constituencies, thus also customers and local communities, that can contribute to the 
survival and development of the business activity. In other words, all those who can 
contribute to the success of the business would need to be treated as part of the team: 
a distinction could, in consequence, be drawn between “internal or insider members of 
the  team”,  i.e.  shareholders,  managers  and  employees,  which  belong  only  to  the 
particular business, and “external or outsider members of the team”, i.e.  creditors, 
suppliers, consumers who enter into long term relationships with the company and 
local communities that, on a lasting base, can provide each of the other class of team 
members  if  satisfied  with  the  company’s  business  activity.  Unlike  the  internal 
members  of  the  team,  the  external  members  do  not  belong  exclusively  to  the 
particular business; however, once accepted that their contributions is as necessary as 
that  of  the  internal  members  of  the  team,  directors  would  need  to  design  such 
strategies as to ensure a continuous  flow of causes and effects between the role and 
satisfaction  of  the  internal  members  of  the  team and the  role  and  satisfaction  of 
external members of the team, so that the latter could confirm their satisfaction over 
time and, eventually, ensure a stronger contribution to the business activity at issue 
than to its possible competitors. 
      Another, and related, adaptation would need to be on the hierarchy conception: 
rather  than  only  a  “mediating  hierarchy”,  directors  would  need  to  operate  as  a 
mediating,  intended  as  conciliating,  and  cultural  hierarchy.  Specifically,  the 
mediation would need to be seen as mediation between competing demands all of 
which can be, in the end, satisfied over time by choices pursuing the ultimate and 
355.
55 J.E.Post, L.E. Preston, S. Sachs, REDEFINING THE CORPORATION, Stakeholder Management 
and Organizational Wealth, Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 46-56. 
56 Idem previous note. 
57 Blair and Stouts, supra n. 10, par. 1.
common concern: this mediation would need to be made by ensuring an “equilibrium 
in satisfactions” of the competing demands, in the sense that the competing demand of 
(group/individual) A would need be satisfied with priority at one occasion and another 
competing demand, expressed by (group/individual)  B, would need to be satisfied 
with priority at another occasion, but, in both occasions, the competing demands of A 
and B would need to be  conciliated by transmitting to the individual/group whose 
competing demand is not given priority the message that a choice not giving priority 
to  its  demand  on that  particular  occasion   is  the best  one  to  satisfy  its  ultimate 
interest  to get continuous returns over time.   To manage to induce the concerned 
individual/group to give priority not to a demand that it may have at a particular time, 
but to its interest to get continuous benefits over time,  directors would certainly need 
to be the trustworthy authority already advocated by the team production model, and 
they should use the trust  placed on them to act  as the “guardians of the business 
survival and development” entrusted with seeking and pursuing the result that unites 
the interests of both internal and external members of the team when choosing, in the 
various occasions, between the competing demands. In acting as “guardians of the 
business  survival  and  development”,  the  “equilibrium  in  satisfactions”  would  be 
intended  to  ensure  the  continuous  contributions  of  all  stakeholders  categories  by 
making convenient for each group a lasting relationship.  In this  role,  to seek and 
pursue the ultimate result of common interest, directors would also need to act as a 
cultural hierarchy in the sense that their strategy would need to transmit each team 
member  a long-term perspective for the assessment of its own interests, and, with  
this, a culture of looking beyond the immediate perceptions. As already highlighted, 
in this long term perspective, the primary concern should be the benefits, over time, 
that  the survival  and the developments  of the business bring to  both internal  and 
external team members. 
    This conceptual  structure could thus be considered as a refined theory of  the 
successful  firm,  and  be  described  as  an  enlarged  and  thus  “enlightened  team 
production model” of firm, or alternatively as a “result primacy approach”. 
    According to this model, which could be adopted to maximise the chances of 
business success on stable basis, the successful firm could be defined as a “business 
activity with the ability of surviving and growing over time on a solid foundation,  
based on a nexus of   (long-term) commitments  on the  part  of  all  those who can  
contribute to its success and who thus need to be treated as part of a team”.
Conceptually, the difference between the “nexus of long-term commitments” and the 
“nexus of contract” vision characterising the theories of companies underlying the 
shareholders  primacy  approach  is  of  key  importance:  a  nexus  of  long-term 
commitments implies not whatever nexus of contract, but a nexus of contract  with 
well defined features in terms of both quality and length. The quality is given by the 
commitment in ensuring a common objective – the getting of benefits over time – and 
the length in  the long-term,  which is  an essential  component  in  the commitment. 
Conversely, a nexus of contract, if referred to generically, does not necessarily imply 
a  nexus of long term commitments. 
     These commitments, together with those of shareholders, make it possible the 
business activity and the production of profits: even if each specific contribution were 
identifiable on its own, the various contributions would not be separable from each 
others in allowing the business activity to survive over time under the best conditions 
and in generating a value which is far greater than the sum of the values of each 
individual  contributions:  the  firm’s  valuation  methods  elaborated  by  the  financial 
literature, particularly in continental Europe, teach that an essential component in the  
overall firm value, even more than the value of the assets, is the “goodwill”, which 
indicates the business activity’s ability to generate profits from its ordinary activity 
over time, which ability needs to be estimated to assess the overall firm value58. The 
higher the coordination amongst all contributors, including both shareholders and all 
other  stakeholders,  and  the  commitment  of  stakeholders  such  as  employees, 
customers,  suppliers  and  creditors,  the  higher  the  business’  activity  chances  to 
consolidate its position and to have an high “goodwill” that, in turn, raises the value 
of the business activity. Coordination and  commitment  require, in turn, a long term 
view.  Without a long-term view on the part of directors and skilled employees, based 
on the benefits that they can get from a relationship with the business activity over 
time, it would become more difficult for the businesses to secure the satisfaction over 
time of their customers. In turn, without the satisfaction of customers over time – i.e. 
without  the  “loyalty” of  a  customer base  – it  would be extremely problematic  to 
estimate a “goodwill” for the business activity.  This because the goodwill,  in the 
most popular methods of determination of the firm’s value, is calculated by predicting 
the profits from the  ordinary business activity, or the cash-flows generated by this 
activity, that can be expected during a number of future years, and by discounting 
these predictions at an interest rate that is supposed to reflect a degree of risk59. The 
prediction of profits or cash flows from the ordinary business activity, in turn, often 
assumes as a starting point  those profits or cash flow obtained in the last financial 
years60. Accordingly, the greater the stability of the customer base and, in general, the 
greater the continuing satisfaction of all constituencies that have allowed the business 
activity to obtain those profits/cash flows in the last years, the lower would be the 
uncertainty for the future and the greater would be the possibility of projecting those 
profits/cash flows in the future, thus to estimate the goodwill. On the contrary,  in the 
situation  of  a  business  relying  on  short-term  and  occasional  relationships,  the 
profits/cash flows from the ordinary activity obtained over the last years cannot be 
reasonably supposed, ex ante, to be obtained again in the future. It would thus become 
problematic to estimate the goodwill. Either the projection of these results would be 
impossible or the calculation would need to use such a high interest rate as to reflect 
the high degree of risk, which would result in a low goodwill.   In turn, a business 
without a perceived goodwill or with a low goodwill is unlikely to manage to secure 
the cooperation of other stakeholders, such as creditors and other financiers, because 
its  ability  to  generate  profits  over  time  (and,  in  the  case  of  creditors  and  other 
financiers, to repay the debits) would be called into question,  or regarded altogether 
as inexistent.. 
         In other words, the crucial factor which shareholder primacy appear to neglect, 
as  regards  shareholders’  position,  is  that  the  key  element  is  not  shareholders’ 
investment  in  the  capital  of  the  corporation,  but  shareholders’  investment  in  the 
business activity run by the corporation.  This investment is made  by means of the  
investment  in  the corporation, but  is  only one  of  the necessary contributions  and 
would certainly not be able to generate the “goodwill” – and thus the dividends for the 
shareholders  themselves  -  on  its  own.   As  noted  above,  popular  methods  of 
determination of the goodwill elaborated by the financial literature and used in the 
financial practice, in turn, indicate that, in determining the value of the goodwill, the 
key component can be found in the profits coming from the ordinary business activity. 
58 See L. Guatri, La valutazione delle aziende, 1990 (L.Guatri, Valuation of firms, 1994), pp. 125-152. 
59 Ib. n. 17, in in particular p. 131-148 where the Author explains the role of the profits of the more recent years in  
the predictions of future profits, and p. 183-191. 
60 Id. n. 18., at p. 131-132.
The ability to obtain profits from this source indicates  sound economic conditions 
and, by allowing the generation of  financial  resources to be in  part  distributed to 
shareholders,  in  part  retained in  the company to  increase its  “reserves”,  turns  out 
increasing the amount of its own permanent resources and thus contributing to sound 
financial conditions too. The sound economic and financial conditions over time are 
the essential requirements for any business to continue being a going concern.  
    Ultimately, this is also the “lesson” to be drawn from a comparative examination of 
the two major corporate collapses of recent years, Enron and Parmalat: the difference 
in the legal system (Enron in a common law system, the US; Parmalat in a civil law 
system, Italy)  and in  the  underlying ownership structures  (dispersed ownership in 
Enron, controlling shareholder in Parmalat) cannot conceal the realisation that both 
Enron and Parmalat had their economic and financial conditions jeopardised, and that 
in both cases the trading margin – thus the profit from the ordinary business activity – 
had been strongly declining prior to the collapse. 
The  criticism,  addressed  to  the  team production  model  by  the  proponents  of  the 
director primacy approach (Bainbridge, 2003) 61 claims that in a large firm the tasks 
performed by the firms’ various constituencies are separable and that thus to call the 
entire  firm  a  team  is  inappropriate  (so  that  the  modern  corporation  would  be  a 
hierarchy of  teams):  nevertheless,  what  this  criticism neglects  to  consider  is  that, 
exactly when the various contributions do not interact properly with each others and 
become not only identifiable but also separable, the business’ ability to generate a 
goodwill is being put at risk and, earlier or later, the possibility for shareholders to 
keep obtaining dividends is compromised.  To the extent that the goodwill – and, with 
it, the value itself of the business activity – can only be created by the “nexus of 
(long-term) commitments” and that the contribution of these is necessary, the “firm- 
specific investment” – as the team production model claims – are inseparable. 
    As a result of all this, the “enlightened” team production model” makes it possible 
to  identify  an  “interest  of  the  company”  relating  not  to  a  particular  category  of 
stakeholders (shareholders or other stakeholders), but to the business activity on its 
own:  the interest to create and maintain the goodwill in the most effective manner, 
i.e., to achieve and maintain sound economic and financial conditions reflecting the 
satisfaction, and the long-term commitment, of all those involved in the company’s 
business life.  In other words, the interest of the company can be identified as the 
interest  to maintain the contribution of all stakeholders, and therefore to ensure the 
best conditions for these contributions, and the underlying long-term commitments, to 
be maintained.  Consequently, in this conception the business activity can be regarded 
as successful when managing to maintain these contributions, and to increase over 
time the underlying long-term commitments.
     The long-term commitment would certainly be not conceivable without a long-
term  view by  each  party  of  the  benefits  arising  out  of  the  relationship  with  the 
business: accordingly, in this model any short term choices by directors should be 
aimed at achieving the result above indicated, i.e. the survival and development of the 
business activity,  which is  in  the common interest  of all  those who give a  stable 
contribution to the business activity and which therefore, for this reason, needs to be 
regarded as the interest of the company. In this model of the successful firm, to the 
extent that any choices is motivated by the achievement of this result,  any choice 
automatically satisfies all interests. Ultimately, this implies that, from the conceptual 
and practical  viewpoints,  there  is  no  space  for  the ranking  of  the  interest  of  one 
category above those of another.   
61 Retro, par. 1, 1.2.
     These observations also invalidate a conclusion, reached by the proponents of 
“directors  primacy”,  that  directors’  authority  and  directors’  accountability  are  not 
compatible on the ground that a greater degree of control over directors’ activity, and 
thus of accountability, would undermine their authority and thus their role as a central 
decision-making power, so that, in the trade-off between authority and accountability, 
authority and fiat power should prevail.  Directors’ independent role, be it described 
in terms of “mediators” or in terms of “central decision-makers with fiat power”, is 
certainly compatible with accountability if accepting the “result primacy” approach 
here  proposed  as  a  theory  of  the  successful  firm,  which  would  make  directors 
accountable for a result. Once again this accountability can be described, simply,  as 
accountability  for  the  creation,  and  over  time  sustainability  (maintaining  and 
increasing) of the firm’s “goodwill”, which finds the best chances in the acceptance of 
an  enlarged/enlightened  team  production  conception  embracing  all  those  that 
contribute to that result.   
      Furthermore, the enlarged/enlightened team production model,  by identifying the 
role of directors in the building and in the maintaining of long-term commitments on 
the  part  of  the  various  stakeholders,  and  by  recognising  the  importance  of  these 
commitments  for  the  creation  and  the  sustainability  of  the  goodwill,  reflects  the 
Principles’  required  focus  on  the  ultimate  economic  outcomes.  The  economic 
outcomes of a business activity find, in the goodwill and its maintaining over time, the 
best condition.    
     To  put  it  differently:  the  long-term contributions  of  all  resources  providers 
(stakeholders), by interacting with each other (e.g., satisfied clients continuing to buy 
goods and/or services and thus providing the financial resources for the company to 
assume new skilled employees and undertake new investments), make it possible the 
creation and consolidation of the goodwill. The latter is going to be higher, the greater 
the number of resources providers who wish to get,  from their contribution to the 
company,  continuous  returns  over  time:  directors’  key  task,  in  their  capacity  as 
“fiduciaries”  of  the  company  and  “guardians  of  businesses  survival  and 
development”,  should thus be that  of  acquiring an increasing number  of  resource 
providers to the company. 
       It may also be said that the “enlarged/enlightened team production model”, by 
emphasizing the result, offers some indication about the meaning of the expression 
“long-term”. This is because the emphasis on the result implies that the commitment 
of each stakeholders group should, at least, last a sufficiently long period to ensure a 
contribution to the result given by the creation and the maintaining of the goodwill. 
This time could be different from company to company, but should in any case be 
such that the satisfaction offered to a stakeholder indices him or her, even after the 
end of the relationship with the company,  to sustain the reputation of the company in 
their socio-economic relationships, and thus to attract new stakeholders offering the 
same kind and quality of contribution.   
     Ultimately, it can be argued that the enlarged team production offers a reply to a 
question  which  was  raised  by  one  of  the  position  which  supports  shareholders 
primacy: this position highlighted that “..the reality of day-to-day managerial decision 
making is one which is replete with trade-offs and competing claims to resources and 
outcomes. Thus, the issue to address head on is: Faced with the task of mediating 
conflicting shareholders interests, what decision criterion should a manager adopt as a 
guideline?”  62.  The  enlarged  team  production  approach  would  reply:  the  guiding 
62 A.K. Sundaram, A.C. Inkpen, Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective Revisited”: A 
Reply”, Organization Science, Vol. 15, No. 3, May-June 2004, pp 370-371.
decision criterion to adopt by a manager in reconciling (not contrasting interests but) 
competing demands is the maintaining of sound economic and financial conditions, 
reflected in the sustainability of the goodwill over time. The purpose of a corporation 
running  a  business  activity  would  be  to  contribute  to  the  satisfaction  of  all 
stakeholders  group,  and  corporations  would  be  accountable,  ultimately,  for  the 
creation  and  the  maintaining  of  the  conditions  in  order  for  all  stakeholders  to 
cooperate towards a common, ultimate purpose.           
    
3.2. The model of the successful firm: the working
   The running of a company according to the enlarged team production model, or, in 
other  words,  the  working  of  the  model  and  its  underlying  assumptions,  could  be 
illustrated as follows. 
      Consumers and, in general, individuals acts and take decisions under conditions of 
“bounded rationality” – i.e., they tend to take what they consider rational decisions, 
on the bases of a limited range of information available – and thus under information 
asymmetries. Exactly for this reason, and in an era (such as the current one) of global 
uncertainty and global insecurity, it appears reasonable to assume that clients, and in 
general all those upon which the life of a business activity depend, tend to trust what 
they know or what they feel that they can easily know. The assumption can thus be 
made that transparency is an increasingly important element for a business activity in 
maintaining the satisfaction of stakeholders, including customers’ satisfaction. Recent 
empirical  research  suggest,  in  fact,  that  perceived  transparency  of  products  and 
services may positively influence the customers’ perception of the value provided by 
the company and, in consequence, may lead to increased customer loyalty63. Thus, 
customers would trust a company and would enter into a long-term relationship with 
it if they feel that they know, and agree with, the decision-making process behind the 
strategies of the companies supplying the products or services that they would buy. 
However,  the  greater  the  possibilities  for  clients  to  know  the  decision-making 
process, the greater the possibility that they wish to offer their view into the process 
and that they would like this view to be an element of the decision-making; on the 
other hand, it can also be expected that, the greater the extent to which the decision-
making process accepts clients’ input, the greater the extent to which clients can trust 
the company.  The same can be expected to apply to all other stakeholder categories, 
as transparency fosters trust. 
     The question would thus become in what way the open and transparent approach 
towards  stakeholders,  which  would  need  to  be  at  the  basis  of  the  enlarged  team 
production model, can be implemented.  New consultative organs, representing the 
view  of  the  various  categories  of  stakeholders,  including  thus  the  views  of  the 
“external team members”, might be a workable hypothesis.  Unlike the typical organs 
that are compulsory in company’s structures devised by the current legal systems – 
the  shareholder’s  meeting,  the  board  of  directors  and  in  some  jurisdictions  the 
supervisory board – the  new consultative organs  could take the form of  optional  
committees,  such  as  e.g.  a  “customers’  committee”,  “investors  committee”  or 
“creditors committee”, whose view should be searched by directors before taking the 
strategic decisions which are deemed to be at the base of day-to-day choices. After 
receiving  the  initial  inputs  (views)  from the  committees,  directors  would  need  to 
identify the aspects unifying the various views, and the choices that would persuade 
63 J. Eskildsen, K. Kristensen,  Customer Satisfaction – The Role of Transparency, Total Quality  
Management & Business Excellence, Vol. 18, No. 1-2,  pp. 39 – 47, January – March 2007, at 43 to 45. 
each committee representing a particular constituency that its view has contributed to 
the final output of the decision-making process; they would also need to transmit to 
the  committee  the  message  that  this  output  allows  the  constituency  group  to  get 
continuous benefits over time from its contribution to the survival and development of 
the business activity.  A permanent communication with each committee would be 
necessary, i.e. a communication at regular time intervals, before the making of the key 
strategic choices and, subsequently, at the time when the results of these choices are 
examined in order either to confirm or to reconsider the choices themselves. In turn, 
the  committee  would  need  to  be  formed  at  the  outset,  i.e.  when  directors  of  a 
company,  by  assumption,  adopt  the  enlarged  team  production  approach,  and  the 
company,  at  that  time,  could  publish  an  “advertisement”  on  the  formation  of  the 
committee  and  calling  for  memberships.  In  an  era  of  uncertainty  and  increasing 
suspect about business conducts, the company following this course of action, and 
transmitting the message that it wishes to start a permanent dialogue with stakeholders 
for the mutual benefit, could not but be expected to attract or increase stakeholders’ 
interest and thus could reasonably expect a positive reply, leading to the formation of 
the committee. The functioning of a decision-making process inspired by the enlarged 
team production approach would,  ultimately, determine a “democratisation” of the 
decision-making  process  within  companies,  and  would  do  so  for  the  purpose  of 
fostering the trust of all groups about their positive returns from the business activity.
     It might apparently be objected that, in the current reality when business decisions 
need to be taken quickly in rapidly changing scenarios,  a decision-making process 
based  on  a  permanent  dialogue  with  these  committees  representing  the  various 
constituencies  would  risk  slowing  down  the  decisions  and  lead  to  complications 
concerning, e.g., the procedures that would need to be set up to demonstrate to each 
committee that his view has contributed to the decisions taken.
     Nevertheless, the objection can easily be rejected if accepting that the mutual trust 
created and maintained by this decision-making process “..fosters the circulation and 
production of knowledge…spreads autonomy and responsibility…lessens the needs 
for controls….speeds up the decision-making processes”64. In effect, the time spent in 
dialogue with each committee representing particular stakeholders groups,  and the 
reduction of the degree of uncertainty in the future scenarios (and thus of the degree 
of  risk  on  the  business  activity)  that  this  would  make  it  possible,  would  well 
compensate the risks that would otherwise be taken by deciding under conditions of 
uncertainty.  The  time  so  spent  can  also  be  expected  to  offset  the  time  which, 
otherwise,  would  in  any  case  be  required  by  a  decision-making  process  giving 
consideration to several factors. It would thus be fully justified, a priori, as part of the 
strategy intended to safeguard the goodwill.
        
3.3. The model of the successful firm and the associative model 
   A decade ago, an “associative model” of the company was developed (Dine, 1998). 
According to this model, when certain groups which are in contractual relationship 
with  the  company  enter  into  a  particularly  close  relationship  with  it  (such  as 
employees or suppliers), an “associative relationship” with the company would need 
to arise, and would give such groups a corporate governance role65.  Certain persons 
64 C.Baccarani, Discovering the Business Soul, in Total Quality Management & Business Excellence, 
Vol. 18, Nos. 1-2, 67-76, January-March 2007, at 70-71 
65 J.Dine, Models of companies and the regulation of groups, Ch. 15, p. 287-301, at 291-292, in Barry 
A.K. Rider (eds), The Corporate Dimension, Jordans, 1998. 
or groups, in this model, would have corporate governance rights when they can show 
that their interests should be considered as part of the company’s interests rather than 
because they belong to a certain group:  specifically, corporate governance rights will 
only be available to those who can prove that,  in that moment in the interest of the  
company, their own interests should be an important element to be taken into account 
by management when determining the interest of the company. The persons or groups 
under consideration, by virtue of their associative rights, would be able to challenge 
management decisions on the ground that the best interest of the company is not being 
pursued because their  own interests,  and thus  their  “associative rights”,  are  being 
disregarded, and this challenge would take place by means of a “derivative action” 
whose eventual winner would always be the company itself66.  
     This associative model, by indicating that the corporate governance rights will be 
available to certain persons, irrespective of the group to whom they belong, provided 
they  can  prove  the  importance  of  their  interests  in  the  particular  time,  marks  a 
decisive departure from the shareholders primacy approach. This because, unlike the 
shareholder primacy, it does not attribute priority to a particular group as such, and 
thus would have the merit of offering the management an  advantage, in terms of 
flexibility,  that  is  denied  by  the  prioritisation  of  the  shareholders  group  in  the 
shareholder primacy approach. At the same time, the associative model, in the phase 
of elaboration it reached, would seem to refer to the interests of the company in  a 
given  moment and  to  require  the  search  of  which  groups  interests,  in  that  given 
moment, would be of utmost importance for the interest of the company. 
    Taking into consideration the distinction here drawn between competing demands 
and contrasting interests,  the notion (extrapolated from the proposed interpretation of 
the  OECD  principles)  of   ‘interests  of  the  company’  as  the  interest  of  business  
survival and development under sound economic and financial conditions, and of all 
(shareholders  and  other)  stakeholders  ultimate  interest  as  the  interest  to  get  
continuous  benefits  over  time,   an  observation  can  be  formulated  in  light  of  the 
associative model.
    The conceptualisation which is central to the enlarged team production approach, 
i.e. the conception of the successful business activity as a business activity based on 
the  conditions under which the profit is obtained and, namely, on a nexus of long-
term commitments on the part  of satisfied stakeholders and thus on the quality of 
profit, would be compatible with the notion, put forward by the associative model, of 
“associative rights” to be recognised to those who have a close relationship with the 
company.  On  the  other  hand,  the  “model  of  the  successful  firm”  here  proposed 
implies that, in order to ensure the maintain and the consolidation of the goodwill, an 
increasing quantity  of  long-term and close relationships  should be developed and 
that,  at whatever time, those who have these close relationships should be attributed 
“associative  rights”.  This  because  their  ultimate  and  common  interest  in  getting 
continuous returns over time, and thus in securing their contributions to the company, 
should  always  be  an  element  –  the  key  element  –  to  be  taken  into  account  by 
management,  as  the  interest  of  the  company  is  exactly  that  of  obtaining  these 
contributions (as inferred from the Principles). The enlarged team production model 
could  thus  be  characterised  as  a  “co-associative  model”,  in  which  the  corporate 
governance  role  would  be  attributed  to  all  stakeholders  to  the  extent  that  all 
stakeholders, in trusting the directors and in taking the long-term perspective, would 
assess their  own interest  in the same way. Specifically, they all  would assess this 
interest in the survival and development of the company under sound economic and 
66 Id, p. 292.
financial conditions, so that any stakeholder group would, thanks to the maintaining 
of the “equilibrium in satisfactions”, not oppose directors’ choices aimed at satisfying, 
at  a  particular  point  in  time,  competing  demands  other  than  its  own  when these 
choices  are the optimal ones to satisfy the ultimate interest of the group concerned 
(in  getting  continuous  returns  over  time)  and  this  group  can  trust  that  its  own 
competing demands can be satisfied at another point in time.    
  The “derivative action” to challenge management choices would, thus, be exercised 
by any stakeholder groups and at whatever time, provided they can prove that these  
choices  compromise  the sound economic  and financial  conditions and,  with these 
conditions, that they compromise the maintaining of the goodwill. Specifically, the 
ground for the derivative action, to be brought ex post, could be that directors should 
have known, ex ante,  that certain choices would compromise the sound economic and 
financial conditions (and thus the possibility for each stakeholders group the get its 
continuous  rewards).  Nonetheless,  the  permanent  dialogue  with  the  committees 
representing  those  (the  stakeholders)  upon  whom  the  maintaining  of  the  sound 
economic and financial conditions ultimately depends, would serve to minimise,  ex 
ante,  the risk of derivative actions: any stakeholders would only be able to bring the 
derivative action, ex post, when either their representing committee has not been set 
up or the committee could claim that his input was disregarded and that, had this input 
been  accepted  in  the  decision-making  process,  the  sound  economic  and  financial 
conditions would had been better  safeguarded.  If  the cases of possible derivative 
actions were so circumscribed,  the risk of derivative actions would be minimised, 
because  the  enlarged  team  production  approach  philosophy  would,  by  definition, 
generate no interest in disregarding the inputs of any stakeholders in the decision-
making.    
       The possibility for any stakeholder groups to have this corporate governance role 
would, of course, presuppose sufficient information available to stakeholders both as 
regards the effects of past choices and as regards the planned future actions. In this 
respect,  it  could  however  be  noted that  not  only the committees  representing  the 
various stakeholders groups, but also the disclosure of information provided for by the 
principles could well form the basis for this stakeholders’ corporate governance role. 
This applies in particular,  on the one hand, to the disclosure of  the financial  and 
operating results of the company, which indicate the effects of past choices, and, on 
the other hand, to the disclosure of foreseeable risk factors, and of issues regarding 
employees and other stakeholders, which may help the understanding of the effects of 
future planned actions. The disclosure of information on future planned actions, in 
turn, is well compatible with the principles, which require that disclosure includes, 
but is not limited to, the elements which are expressly listed.
 
3.3. The model of the successful firm vs. property rights 
   The classic shareholders primacy approach would probably criticise the enlarged 
team production model on the ground that (in its view) this model would prevent 
shareholders from enjoying their property rights.
   There is no doubt that, together with the rights of all other stakeholders groups 
involved in the business activity, also the property rights of shareholders need to be 
protected: in addition to property protection provided by a national legal system, the 
need for this protection follows, ultimately, from Art. 17 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (“Everyone has the right to own property alone….No one shall be 
arbitrary  deprived  of  his  property”).  Nonetheless,  as  highlighted  in  the  previous 
paragraph,  the property rights  of shareholders only consist  of  a form of  rights  to  
future income flows,  and,  without  the future income flows,  the financial  property 
represented by shares would have no value for shareholders. In effect, it can be noted 
that, in addition to income flows in the form of dividends, shares do attribute other 
rights,  such  as  the  voting  rights  –  and,  in  systems  characterised  by  concentrated 
ownership – they also attribute the power to decide directly corporate policies, but 
these other rights need to be seen as instrumental to the rights to future income flows. 
Without concrete prospects of future income flows, in turn, no future increase in the 
market value of shares would be possible.
   Consequently, the only way to effectively protect shareholders rights is to secure 
the best conditions in order for these future income flows to continue over time, or, in 
other words, in order for the “income rights” to be of value to the owner. If accepting 
that  the  income  flows  would  be  threatened  without  all  stakeholders’  continuing 
satisfaction, it follows that stakeholders’ corporate governance role – due to the fact 
that it would be aimed at preserving for their own satisfaction the business survival 
under sound economic and financial conditions -   would also, be definition, protect  
the income rights of financial investors, i.e. of shareholders. To put it differently, a 
corporate governance system inspired by a co-associative model would ensure the 
optimal conditions for the financial property (represented by shares) to be of value to 
its  owners  (whether  these  owners  are  controlling  shareholders  or  minority 
shareholders). 
      The enlightened team production approach would thus protect the property rights 
of  shareholders,  but  would  recognise  that  this  protection  actually  lies  in  the 
conditions under which the profit from the core business is obtained. It also suggests a 
definition of the concept of protection of financial investor, which represents a  first  
and  necessary  level  of  protection and  without  which  the  concepts  of  protection 
typically identified by the legal literature and offered in national legal systems (such 
as  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders  against  possible  abuses  by  controlling 
shareholders in systems characterised by concentrated ownerships, or the protection 
by means of transparency and financial disclosure) would risk being incomplete and 
of limited use to shareholders/ investors.
    Specifically, the concept of protection of property rights of financial  investors 
suggested by the enlarged team production could be defined as follows: “protection of 
the rights  to future income flows (and/or to future increase in value) acquired by 
shareholders, by means of the safeguard of the most durable conditions in order for 
these income flows to derive from solid foundations lying in long-term relationships 
with satisfied stakeholders, and thus to continue over time”. This definition indicates 
that, with regard to the value of the financial property represented by the shares as 
“income rights”, this value is a consequence of the goodwill acquired and maintained 
by the business activity and of the quality of the relationships, with all constituencies,  
which are at the basis of that goodwill: the immediate implication is that the value of 
shares – if these are properly understood as “rights to future earnings” -  is higher the 
lower is the uncertainty in the future ability to generate profits over time,  i.e. the 
value of shares is higher the wider is the nexus of long-terms commitments on which 
the business activity can rely.  
    The open and transparent decision-making process relying on a permanent dialogue 
with committees representing the various stakeholders groups, to the extent that it 
would manage to maintain stakeholders’ satisfaction, would also manage to secure the 
protection of property rights of financial investors according to this definition. 
    This  definition,  in  turn,  applies  to  investors  in  companies  of  whatever  size, 
including  the  biggest  multinational  companies:  it  follows  that  these  companies, 
according  to  the  enlarged  team production  conception,  would  need  to  secure  the 
satisfaction  of  stakeholders  in  all  countries in  which,  through  subsidiaries  or 
branches, they operate. However, it must be recalled that stakeholders’ satisfaction 
implies, ultimately, a positive assessment by stakeholders of the output of companies’ 
decision-making,  i.e.  an  assessment  according  to  which  directors’  choices  are 
perceived by stakeholders as protecting their own interest.  In this respect, the theme 
of the interrelationships between the operations of multinational companies and the  
advancement of human rights – which has attracted increasing interest in the literature 
over the last few years67 – comes directly into play.    
3.2. The model of the successful firm vs. human rights:  business sustainability and  
global sustainability  
     The enlarged team production approach would, obviously, generate or increase the 
awareness that stakeholders’ satisfaction could not be achieved without the respect of 
stakeholders’ human rights. From this viewpoint, the kinds of conduct towards the 
different groups of stakeholders which was indicated by the UN Norms concerning 
companies’  responsibilities  with  regard  to  human  rights68 can  be  regarded  as  the 
necessary precondition for that satisfaction: this applies to the provision to workers of 
a safe and health working environment and the payment to them of a remuneration 
capable of ensuring adequate living conditions69 ,  to the offer of safe and quality 
goods and services70, to environmental protection etc.. Although recent developments 
at the UN level have challenged the relevance of these Norms as a standard setting 
instrument71,  the  enlarged  team production  approach would  consider  the  conducts 
indicated by that document as the precondition for the sustainability of the goodwill, 
by means of the widening of the base of satisfied stakeholders,  in all countries in  
which the company operates. This implies that, even in less developed countries, a 
multinational  whose  strategy  were  guided  by  the  enlightened  team  production 
approach would identify local population (not as resources to exploit thanks to cheap 
labour costs in order to obtain products to be sold in the markets of richer countries, 
but) as new communities which would be capable of providing – if their standard of 
living were increased – an additional base of satisfied stakeholders, e.g., new (local) 
customers which would open up new markets and boost the global goodwill of the 
business activity (and thus, ultimately, increase the value of the business activity).    
67 On the problematic aspects involved on this theme, J.Dine, Companies, International Trade and 
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      This strategy would, in the end, turn up being particularly profitable, as markets in  
richer countries may risk a gradual saturation and tend to grow at a much slower pace  
than  markets  in  less  developed  countries  entering  a  booming  phase.  It  would 
ultimately lead the company’s strategic decision-making to identify the increasing in 
the  standard  of  living  of  less  developed  countries  as  being  in  the  interest  of  the 
company itself.  In other words,  business sustainability in the long-run and  global 
sustainability of the market-based economic system would need to be regarded as the 
cause  and  the  effect  of  each  others  in  a  virtuous  circle,  which  would  ultimately 
generate a more balanced development of the world economy.
     For these reasons, a conception inspired by the enlarged team production would 
bring a new dimension to the theme of multinational companies and human rights. 
The issue would be not only the one which has been central in the current literature – 
i.e., how to hold multinational corporations to respect human rights when they fail to 
do so72 – but also a new issue: how to shape a legal environment that could induce 
multinational  corporations  to  consider  in  their  own  interest the  respect  and  the 
advancement of human rights. The analytical approach would thus need to be not only 
taking for granted the non respect of human rights by trans-national corporations and 
investigating whether there are sanctions and remedies, but also investigating possible 
manners of encouraging the respect and the promotion of human rights by means of 
positive  legislative  action.  This  would  be  a  key  challenge  for  the  corporate 
governance and company law related debates and for the global political agenda.    
3.3. The model of the successful firm and the shape of the corporate governance legal  
framework:  first basic hypothesis on the response to the key challenge 
   It  follows  from the  arguments  expressed  above  that  the  shape  of  a  corporate 
governance legislative framework inspired by the enlarged team production approach 
would face a twofold challenge: on the one hand, the classic imposition of duties on 
directors and the provision of sanctions for not compliance (which is typical of all 
current frameworks);  on the other hand and even more important, the design of a 
system of incentives that would need to stimulate directors and the whole company’s 
organisation structure to “internalise” the enlarged team production philosophy, i.e. 
the design of a system of incentives that would stimulate the spontaneous adoption of 
the conduct required by the legal environment and possibly of an even higher standard 
of socially responsible and stakeholders’ engagement - based conduct (which would 
lead to the promotion of human rights).
    As regards the imposition of duties and the sanctions for non-compliance, it may be 
inferred,  from the OECD Principles, that  the duty of care and the duty of loyalty 
commonly provided for in the current legal frameworks would certainly need to be 
maintained and strengthened. As previously argued, the duty of loyalty – i.e. the duty 
to act in the best interest of the company and the shareholders -  would need to be 
intended in the sense that the best interest of the company implies the safeguard of 
interests  of  existing  stakeholders  to  continue  to  provide  the  company  with  the 
resources that are needed for the business activity survival and development73. With 
regard  to  multinational  companies,  it  may  be  added  that  the  best  interest  of  the 
company would also imply, as part of the duty of loyalty, the consolidation of a base 
of  satisfied stakeholders  in  all  countries  where the  company operates,  in  order  to 
72 Which issue has been the subject of much debate: see supra, notes 67 and 71. 
73 Retro, par. 2, 2.1.
ensure the best conditions for the sustainability of the global goodwill: arguably, the 
respect of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises74 could be assumed, for 
this purpose, as a  minimum standard to be complied with. In fact,  the Guidelines, 
which provide voluntary principles for responsible business conduct - and in so doing, 
indicate standards of behaviour by multinationals as regards their general policies75, 
their  disclosure  of  comprehensive  information76,  their  employment  and  industrial 
relations77,  their  contribution  to  the  protection  of  environment,  public  health  and 
safety78, their refusing bribery practices79, their protecting consumers interests in the 
safety  and quality  of  the  goods  and services  they  provide80,  their  conducting  the 
businesses in a manner compatible with science and technology policies and plans of 
the countries where they operate81,  their  carrying on the  activity  in  a  competitive 
manner82 and  their  compliance  with  tax  obligations83 -  are,  ultimately,  aimed  at 
fostering complementarities  between the activities  of  multinational  enterprises and 
sustainable  development84.  The  Guidelines  intend  to  do  so  by  encouraging 
multinationals to respect human rights, not only in their dealings with employees but 
also with respect  to  others affected by their  activities,  and,  in  the  context  of  this 
general  objective, they recognise the importance of the development and effective 
application  of  self-regulatory  practices  and  management  systems  that  foster  a  
relationship  of  mutual  trust  between  enterprises  and  society85.    Because  this 
relationship  is  an  essential  condition  for  the  sustainability  of  the  goodwill,  and 
because  the  respect  of  human  rights  which  underpins  the  Guidelines  is  the  first 
condition for the promotion of human rights,  a first step in shaping an international 
corporate governance framework inspired by the co-associative model could be that 
of  ensuring,  by  each  individual  State,  that  all its  internal  laws  concerning  the 
regulation of companies and their relationships with third parties reflect exactly the 
Guidelines, and that a breach of these laws by directors be always treated as a breach 
of  the  duty  of  loyalty,  which  should  give  rise  to  directors’  liability  towards   the 
company,   the  shareholders  and  the  stakeholders.  Specifically,  directors’  liability 
towards the company could be based on the fact that directors, by failing to comply 
with the rules reflecting the Guidelines and thus by compromising the mutual trust 
between  the  business  and  society,  have  failed  to  pursue  the  best  interest  of  the 
company. In turn, directors’ liability towards shareholders could be based on the fact 
that this failure to pursue the best interest of the company, by resulting in a failure to 
pursue the sustainability of the goodwill,  has compromised shareholders’  rights to 
obtain continuing income from their  shares,  and – because the expectations about 
future dividends determine the increase in share values – has also compromised the 
possibility of increase in share value. Lastly, directors’ liability towards stakeholders 
could be articulated in a liability towards the category of stakeholders which has been 
directly affected, in a negative way, by directors’ failure to comply with the relevant 
rules (e.g., directors’ liability towards consumers for a company’s failure to guarantee 
74 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2000 (hereinafter: the Guidelines).
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85 Guidelines, p. 19 and Commentary, p. 42.
the  quality  and  safety  of  products),  and  in  a  “derivative”  liability  towards  other 
categories of stakeholders.  This latter  liability would derive from the fact  that,  by 
failing to comply with rules intended to safeguard one category of stakeholders and 
thus by compromising the continuation of this category’s contribution, directors have 
compromised the possibility for all other categories of stakeholders to get continuous 
returns over time. 
    Once directors’ duty of loyalty were conceived in this way, directors’ duty of care, 
which is commonly understood as the duty “..to act on a fully informed basis, in good 
faith, with due diligence and care”86,  should also be conceived in a consistent way. 
As noted in the Principles’ annotations, in some jurisdictions there is a standard of 
reference which is the behaviour that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in 
similar circumstances and,  in nearly all  jurisdictions,  this  duty does not  extend to 
errors of business judgment, so long as board members are not grossly negligent and a 
decision is made with due diligence etc..87. The non-extension of the duty to errors of 
business judgement, generally known in several jurisdictions as “business judgment 
rule”, is intended to safeguard the margin for managerial discretion. Once all internal 
laws concerning the regulation of companies and their relationships with third parties 
reflected, in each State, exactly the contents of the current Guidelines, the duty of care 
could be conceived as implying that acting on a fully informed bases and with the 
behaviour  of  a  reasonably  prudent  person,  or,  in  other  words,  avoiding  gross 
negligence on the part of directors, would always make it necessary to develop and to 
effectively  apply  self-regulatory  practices  and  management  systems  that  foster  a  
relationship of mutual trust between enterprises and society. This on the ground that, 
without this mutual trust,  the survival and development of the business activity would 
be put at risk and it would not be possible to foresee the responses by stakeholders to 
company’s choices, so that whatever action could not be taken on a fully informed 
basis.  Consequently,  the  margins  of  managerial  discretion  could  remain,  but  this 
managerial  discretion,  and  the  protection  offered  by  the  business  judgment  rule, 
would  need  to  be  circumscribed,  ex  ante (i.e,  before  the  making  of  strategic 
decisions), to the choice of the self-regulatory practices and self management systems 
that foster the relationship of mutual trust between the business and society. The lack 
of a choice for any of these possible management systems would need to indicate a 
breach of the duty of care.
     Amongst the several possible practices and management systems to be adopted for 
this purpose, the second challenge for a corporate governance framework inspired by 
the co-associative model would thus become how to encourage companies to opt for 
the creation of the consultative stakeholders committees that would make the model 
work. 
     The question would thus become which system of incentives could be designed, 
and within which legal framework. It was said that corporate governance ‘embraces 
the entire framework within which companies operate’88: ultimately,  all areas of law 
compose this framework, and do so by including national legislation, supranational 
legislation,  i.e.  EC legislation,  and international  law. The question concerning the 
framework within which the incentives could be designed includes both within which 
area of law, and at which level (national, supranational, international).   
86 OECD Principles, Annotations, p. 59
87 Id. Previous note.
88 A. Cadbury,  Highlights of the Proposal of the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance,  in D Prentice and P Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 46.
    Because the enlarged team production conception would value the building up and 
the  maintaining  of  stable  relationships  with  stakeholders  based  on  a  continuous 
satisfaction, which allow the survival and development of the business activity on a 
solid foundation and thus its long-term success, the key feature of this system lies in 
the fact that it would need to  encourage the building and the maintaining of these 
relationships. 
    Hypothesis for this purpose could be designed both in the company law context and 
in the broader regulatory environment. With regard to the use of company law-related 
incentives, it must be noted that the purpose of some fulfilments that are typically 
required by company law in any jurisdiction – such as the requirements whereby the 
contributions in kind needs appraisal by expert professionals, or whereby the annual 
accounts of companies whose size exceed certain thresholds need to be subject to 
external auditors -  can be found exactly in the protection of third parties dealing with 
companies. Their protection would, however, also be ensured by the adoption of the 
enlightened  team  production  approach:  therefore,  a  first  kind  of  incentive  for 
companies adopting this approach could lie in some requirements being made  less 
onerous or relaxed altogether when their ultimate purpose would be satisfied in any 
case by the spontaneous adoption, by the company concerned, of the enlarged team 
production model. An example could be offered by the choice which was made, by 
the  EC  legislator,  through  the  introduction  of  Directive  2006/68/EC  on  the 
simplification of the requirements that were laid down by the Second Company Law 
Directive on the formation and alteration of capital of public limited companies89. The 
underlying philosophy was, as stated in the Preamble of that Directive,  to make more 
flexible the formation of  capital of public limiting companies without decreasing the 
protection offered to members of the company and to the category of stakeholders 
which was regarded as directly affected, i.e., in that case the category of creditors90. 
The philosophy underlying that  choice could be generalised to other requirements 
which, in the past experience, have not proven to be effective towards their purpose, 
such as the external auditing requirements91 and others to be identified by an in-depth 
analysis of their effectiveness: the greater the protection spontaneously offered by a 
company to all stakeholders groups, the greater the degree of flexibility that could be 
introduced in these requirements.  This because the protection of stakeholders, that 
the requirements under consideration aim to offer, would  already be offered by the 
adoption of the enlarged team production approach.  
      A  second  kind  of  incentives,  to  be  introduced  in  the  broader  regulatory 
framework,  could  lie  in  systems  of  tax  reductions  and/or  financial  incentives  for 
companies  adopting  the  enlarged  team production  approach in  their  operations  at 
national and world-wide levels: in the case of multinational companies operating in 
less developed countries, the system could work as follows. Tax reductions and/or 
financial incentives in the form of non-refundable grants could be offered by the State 
of the parent company and the State of the local subsidiary to those multinationals 
that, in their operations in the less developed country, internalise the enlarged team 
production  philosophy  and  aim  at  turning  local  population  into  new  satisfied 
stakeholders groups by spontaneously promoting the human rights and increasing the 
standard of life of local population. The time from which the tax reductions and/or the 
non-refundable grants would be available could coincide with the time from which the 
company, by advertising its intention to form committees representing local workers, 
89 Directive 2006/68/EC of 6 September 2006, in 2006 OJEC L 264/32 
90 See Directive in previous note, Preamble, recital 2.
91 Certainly ineffective, e.g., in the Enron case.
local consumers etc…, makes it clear its adoption of the co-associative model; the 
incentives  would  then  need  be  confirmed,  year  by  year,  upon  a  satisfactory 
performance indicated by the committee to public authorities.      
   These  incentive  mechanisms,  and  the  underlying  strategy,  are  not  new.  This 
strategy  is,  in  fact,  already  adopted  by  the  EC’s  ‘Competitiveness’  program 
introduced for the period 2007 to 201392.  As known, this program offers grants to 
businesses  which  undertake  responsible  and  sustainable  development  initiatives. 
Thus, the grant of tax reliefs and/or financial  subsidies to businesses adopting the 
enlarged team production model, if these incentives were granted by the EC, could be 
seen  as  an  extension  of  this  program.  Moreover,  it  may  be  argued  that,  if  these 
incentives were granted by individual States, EC Member States would find that the 
subsidies and/or tax relief would be compatible with the EC objectives, and both these 
States  and  non-EC Member  States  would  find  that  the  incentives  would  contrast 
neither with the wider WTO system nor with the OECD constitutional framework. 
    Specifically, the compatibility between tax and/or grants incentives to companies 
adopting  the  enlarged  team  production  approach  and  the  EC  legal  order  can  be 
deduced, in addition to the fact that these incentives could be seen as an extension of 
the ‘Competitiveness’ program if they were granted by the EC, from the fact that the 
incentives would not fall within the prohibition of State aids to enterprises under Art. 
87 of the EC Treaty if they were granted by Member States. This is because  the 
adoption of the enlarged team production approach, and thus of the availability of the 
incentives, would be opened to all businesses: this implies that the incentives would 
lack the characteristic of being ‘selective’ in favour of some businesses, which feature 
is essential to the very definition of State aid93. Thus, they would not fall within the 
State  aid concept,  and this  would apply to  incentives addressed to  EC companies 
operating  within  the  Community.  As  regards  EC  companies  operating  in  third 
countries and in particular in less developed countries, the incentives (in addition to 
not  falling  within  the  prohibition  of  State  aids  and  to  not  affecting  the  trade  as 
between Member States) would be consistent with the agreements entered into by the 
Community and third (less developed) countries, for these agreements are, ultimately, 
aimed at helping the improvement in the standards of living of the third countries 
concerned and this improvement would be also brought about by the adoption of the 
co-associative model and the consequent advancement of CSR on a global scale, thus 
by the advancement of human rights of local population. 
    In  turn,  the  compatibility  between  the  granting  by  individual  States  of  the 
incentives under consideration and the WTO rules would derive from the fact that 
these incentives would cause no distortion to trade and no discrimination, and would 
help promoting the constitutional purposes of the WTO itself. The lack of distortion to 
trade and of discrimination would depend on the fact  that,  whatever the sector of 
activity and the markets in which the recipient companies export, the incentives could 
not (be expected to) favour domestic companies and productions in their competition 
with foreign companies. This is because such incentives would be equally available in 
any  State  to  whatever  company,  either  domestic  or  foreign,  adopts  the  socially  
responsible behaviour inspired by the enlarged team production conception, and in so 
doing increases the standard of living of local population and promotes human rights. 
In turn, the increasing in the standard of living is,  together with the promotion of 
92 For details on this program, www.cipprogram.com
93 ECJ 15 July 2004, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL 1964 E.C.R. 585, Para. “On the interpretation 
of Art. 93”. 
employment  and  of  sustainable  development,  an  objective  indicated  amongst  the 
WTO general goals,  as well  as  amongst the constitutional  purposes of the OECD 
Convention which refers to an healthy economic expansion in member countries as 
well as in non member countries (Art. 1 OECD Convention).
     Ultimately, a business conduct reflecting the enlarged team production conception 
would, due to the internalisation of stakeholders’ concerns in the decision-making and 
to  the  search  of  mutually  beneficial  relationships,  enhance  CSR well  beyond the 
internationally accepted point of reference given by the universally known SA8000 
standards  (which  is  a  global  social  accountability  standards  for  decent  working 
conditions)94, and would be an effective response to the appeal launched to businesses 
of whatever size by the 2007 Dresden meeting of G8 Ministers of Labour who invited 
the adoption, by businesses, of socially responsible conduct.          
3.4. The model of the successful firm: possible criticism and counter-arguments
  
   The model of the successful firm can meet several objections.
   First, it might be submitted that the fact that the Principles and their annotations, in 
recognising that the competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result 
of  a  teamwork  that  embodies  contribution  from  a  range  of  different  resource 
providers, includes, in the list of resource providers, investors, employees, creditors 
and suppliers, but not the clients and local communities, implies that the model of the 
successful firm here proposed goes beyond the Principles and cannot be taken as a 
base  for  the  development  of  a  corporate  governance  framework  applying  those 
Principles.  
    Nevertheless, this objection would be unfounded for at least two reasons. First, the 
Principles only provide for minimum standards, and, in so doing, they suggest means 
to achieve the objectives that they identify. As a result, any theory of the operation of 
successful companies which suggest a conceptual structure which is more “tailored”, 
than the general theories of the operation of a firm, to a successful firm, can better 
form  the  basis  for  a  corporate  governance  framework  to  achieve  the  objectives 
identified by those Principles and is also consistent with the Principles themselves. 
Second, the fact that - unlike employees, creditors and suppliers - customers, together 
with  local  communities,  are  not  always  indicated  amongst  the  resources 
providers/stakeholders, offers a clear indication about the case when these groups can 
also  be  assumed to  be  resources  providers:  arguably,  they  can  be  assumed to  be 
resources providers, and thus stakeholders, when they have a lasting relationship with 
the company, i.e.  a continuous provision of  (financial and human) resources over 
time that, ultimately, brings them within the “team” of those interested in the success 
of the company (together with employees, creditors and suppliers which are always 
assumed, by the principles, to belong to that team). Again, the example of the turning 
of “occasional customers” into “stable customers” illustrates why this category can 
become  part  of  the  “team”,  and  when  customers  provide  the  essential  financial 
resources, and the base for the survival in the market, without which the resources 
provided  by  the  other  stakeholders  would  be  purposeless  and  without  which  the 
success of the company, highlighted by the Principle, would be impossible. The same 
94 SA 8000, which is based on the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on the 
Right of the Child and various International Labour Organisation Conventions, is developed and 
overseen by Social Accountability International: see http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?&stopRedirect=1
applies  to  local  communities,  when  perceive  positive  effects  from  company’s 
activities  and  they  provide  the  company  with  the  other  kind  of  stakeholders 
(employees, creditors, customers etc..).     
     Second, it may be objected that the validity of whatever model lies in its capacity 
to predict what may occur in the real world and, in this connection, in the ability of 
the assumptions on which the model is based to reflect the behaviour of agents in the 
real world. On this base, the criticism may be that, in the real world, it is difficult to 
identify when directors’ strategy aims at maintaining long-term relationships with the 
various categories.  In addition,  it  might be said that,  in case of public companies 
carrying  out  large  scale  commercial  enterprises,  such  as  listed  companies  with 
thousands of employees and of clients, the model could not work because it would be 
impossible  or  difficult  even  to  monitor  or  to  establish  whether  the  company  is 
maintaining  long-term  relationships  with  individual  employees  or  individual 
customers, and in any case  that, if directors perceive that long-term relationship were 
not  important  for  profitability,  they  would  not  attach  importance  to  them. 
Nonetheless, this objection would neglect the very purpose of the model and, with 
this, the purpose of Principles themselves. The Principles have been elaborated to 
indicate not what occur or may occur in the real business world in the way in which 
publicly listed companies operate, but what should occur; in other words, they do not 
aim to predict possible situations, but – as above indicated – to set objectives. The 
same holds true for the enlarged/enlightened team production model, which intends to 
indicate how, in terms of approach by directors in the fulfilment of their duties, the 
objectives set out by the Principles could be best achieved: unlike economic models, 
the purpose of the conceptual structure here proposed is to suggest what should occur 
(and it  could not  be  otherwise,  in  order  for  this  model  to  be  consistent  with  the 
principles). In addition, because the Annotations  - which concern exactly publicly 
listed companies – stress the need for high ethical standards, in the long term interests 
of the company, to make the company credible and trustworthy not only in day-to-day 
operations but also with respect to longer term commitments (p. 60),  it can be argued 
that all long-term relationships, without which long-term commitments could not be 
conceived, are important for large scale commercial enterprises too, and thus should 
be fostered by the strategies designed by directors.       
     Third, it may be submitted that the Principles – contrary to what was argued above 
-  cannot give the lie to the shareholders primacy model on its entirety,  but rather 
reflect  a  compromise,  because  they  state  that  there  is  no  good  single  model  of 
corporate governance and because they were agreed also by countries embracing the 
shareholders  primacy.   The  response  to  the  objection is,  however,  implicit  in  the 
arguments  formulated  in  the  previous  pragraph:  specifically,  even  though  the 
principles may reflect a compromise that lead to common elements, the achievement 
of the compromise inevitably determines the giving up, by some negotiating parties 
(States), of their own original positions (position given, by assumption, by a vision of 
the shareholder primacy model as the only good one) in the negotiation process, and it 
makes important the search of the best way in which the outcomes advocated by the 
compromise (in this case, the objectives advocated by the principles) can be achieved. 
Exactly this search lies behind the proposal for the co-associative model.  
   Fourth, it may be objected that the enlarged/enlightened team production model, by 
emphasizing  a  result,  is  not  so  different  from  the  shareholders  primacy  model: 
specifically, it may be submitted that the shareholders primacy model – by requiring 
the maximisation of shareholders wealth – also uses an objective yardstick, where 
shareholders  wealth  is  measured  by  shares  value.  This  objection  might  be 
strengthened by saying that share value can be easily read from the market, whereas 
the economic and financial conditions may not be properly assessed in the event of 
accounting manipulations. 
     Nevertheless, the reply to the objection appears to be easy. First, the event of 
accounting manipulations falls exactly within the category of behaviours inspired by a 
contrasting interest – i.e., by an interest to conceal the true economic and financial 
conditions, and thus an interest in contrast with the survival and development of the 
company – that a conduct guided by an enlarged team production model would aim at 
avoiding  and  would  actually  avoid.  It  would  do  so,  exactly  because  the  conduct 
inspired by the enlarged team production model, in seeking the truest illustration of 
the economic and financial conditions of the company, would have no incentive to 
accounting  manipulations,  and  would  not  need  to  do  so  because  the  persistent 
satisfaction  of  stakeholders  groups  would  lead  to  the  maintaining  of  the  wealth-
creating cooperation that is at the basis of sound economic and financial conditions 
that can last over time.   In addition, a framework leaving still space for accounting 
manipulations would be in contrast not only with the enlarged team production model, 
but with the OECD Principles in themselves. Second, the criticism against the share 
value parameter already put forward by the position advocating the team production 
model – i.e., the realisation that the share value is only one indicator, and that many 
other indicators are equally if not even more important - holds fully valid also in the 
enlarged team production model.  Third, and most importantly,  it may be noted that 
the  shareholders  primacy  model,  when  indicating  as  a  key  concern  the 
“maximisation”  of  shareholders’  wealth,  fails  to  consider  the  fact  that,  due  to 
information asymmetries,  it is not even possible to know whether the profits or the 
share value are actually maximised during any given financial year: if “maximisation” 
is measured according to what is known by them, directors may believe, e.g., that the 
profits is maximised in a given period because all opportunities known to them have 
been exploited. Nonetheless, what is known to directors could well be different from 
what would have been actually possible to achieve, at least to the extent that what 
would have been actually possible to achieve to the company, in terms of profits, 
depends on what would have been stakeholders’ responses to company’s choices if 
these  choices  had  been  different.  Consequently,  it  may  well  be  argued  that  the 
“maximisation” advocated by shareholders primacy ultimately ends up relying on the 
subjective  perception  of  what  is maximised,  whereas  the  fact  in  itself  of  the 
continuation of the business activity over time would be an objective yardstick. In this 
regard, the model here proposed would indicate that “maximisation” can refer to the 
survival  of  the  business  activity  in  itself  (i.e.,  the  benefits  brought  about  by  the 
business  activity  to  shareholders  and  to  other  stakeholders  would  be  maximised 
because the business activity survives).
3.5. Potential directions for future research
      
  At least four potential directions for future research appear to be opened by
the conception of the successful company as a company whose corporate governance 
approach would be based on the co-associative model and by the shape of a corporate 
governance system based on this approach.  
        A first direction for research would of course lie in the deepening of the study on 
the optimal features of a corporate governance framework that would be based on the 
enlarged  team production  model  and  would  encourage  companies  to  promote  the 
advancement  of  human  rights.  Within  this  line  of  research,  the  modalities  of 
stakeholders’  participation  by  means  of  the  optional  committees,  namely  the 
composition of the committees, their renewal, the internal working and so on, are all 
issues which appear to deserve to be dealt with by in-depth proposals. Within this 
research direction, a research issue would be how to avoid that the working of the 
enlarged team production model would risk being threatened by “free-riders” or by 
opportunistic  behaviours.  E.g.,  it  may  be  said  that  it  could  be  threatened  by 
individuals that may express an interest in membership of the committees, but that, at 
the  same  time,  may  have  an  interest  in  competing  businesses  and  may  disclose 
“sensitive” information to competitors. A legislative corporate governance framework 
inspired by the enlarged team production approach would need to find the way to 
avoid this risk: the hypothesis on the composition of the committees, on their renewal 
and on their internal working would need to put forward solutions in this respect. 
Moreover,  the  fact  that  the  permanent  dialogue  between  the  company  and  the 
stakeholders’  committee  would  serve  to  consolidate  long-term  relationships,  to 
transmit stakeholders the message that their concerns are internalised in the decision-
making and thus to achieve stakeholders’ satisfaction, would raise the issue of how to 
monitor  this  satisfaction  and  the  company’s  ability  to  attract  an  increasing 
stakeholders base over time. The response could lie in the identification of a set of 
non-economic  and  non-financial  parameters  which  could  indicate,  within  an 
appropriate  length  of  time,  the  degree  of  satisfaction  needed  for  all  current 
stakeholders, and the company’s ability of turning potential stakeholders into actual 
stakeholders.  Because  this  ability  would  correspond  to  the  business’  ability  of 
maintaining and increasing the goodwill,  nationally as well  as internationally,  and 
because in the enlarged team production model this maintaining and increasing of the 
goodwill  would  correspond to  the  promotion  of  CSR and to  the  advancement  of 
human rights, these parameters could serve three purposes. One would be to provide a 
measure to assess satisfactory performance of directors’ duties. The second would be 
to offer a ‘score’ through which to monitor the company’s performance in terms of 
CSR and advancement of human rights. The third, and consequent, purpose would be 
to offer a contribution to the discussions on corporations and human rights which 
have highlighted the importance of learning, capacity-building and the prevention of 
disputes in the relationships between corporations and stakeholders. These discussions 
have indicated that, at the corporate level, capacity building and learning could take 
place  through  the  transfer  of  learning  from  one  site  of  operations  to  another95. 
Consequently, it  may be argued that,  because the assessment of their own interest 
under a long term perspective should be part of the learning under the enlarged team 
production approach, the parameters could also serve to assess the effectiveness of the 
transfer of learning in each period of measurement and the areas where improvement 
may be needed.     
    A second direction could relate specifically the model here proposed with EC law.
In a preliminary work, it was argued that each of the key elements of the most widely 
accepted  definition  of  corporate  governance,  which  can  be  extrapolated  from the 
OECD Principles, could be red as implicitly dealt with in the acquis communautaire, 
and that, by reassembling all indications, corporate governance as implied in EC law 
could  be  read  as   “the  system  by  which  companies  are  directed  and  controlled, 
through a set  of relationships between the management,  the board, the controlling 
95 Corporations and Human Rights: Accountability Mechanisms for Resolving Complaints and 
Disputes, Report of Multi-Stakeholder Workshop  report, Harvard Business School, 11-12 April 2007, 
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shareholders and other stakeholders, in such a way as to pursue the ultimate objective 
of  development  of  the  business  activity  under  sound  economic  and  financial 
conditions”96. Because this work suggests that the co-associative model could offer, 
ex ante, the optimal conditions for making it possible the development of the business 
activity  under  sound economic  and financial  conditions,  proposes  how the  model 
could work and formulates first hypothesis on how a corporate governance framework 
based on this model could be shaped, a research direction could be which pieces of 
the acquis communautaire would already be not only compatible, but also geared to 
the working of the co-associative model. Here, the attention would need to be paid not 
only on EC company law, but also on EC labour, social, consumer and contract law, 
to identify where the acquis communautaire would favour the building of long-term 
relationships  valued  by  the  co-associative  model  as  essential  for  the  long-term 
business survival. It was stated by the Commission that “CSR mirrors the core values 
of the EU itself”97:  because the co-associative model would explain why business 
success would be related to CSR and why it could go hand in hand with the promotion 
of  CSR  itself,  a  research  line  aimed  at  finding  which  pieces  of  the  acquis 
communautaire would already be geared to the working of the co-associative model 
would also indicate which pieces of the acquis communautaire could be regarded as 
being more directly linked to CSR.  
    A third direction could lie in the proposition of a partially new approach to assess 
the protection of investors in comparative corporate governance literature. Prior to the 
corporate collapses at the start of the century, a comparative literature had already 
construed an ‘investor protection index’, based on a pre-defined set of shareholders’ 
rights  and  had  found  that  common  law  countries  perform  better  than  civil  law 
countries; the rights included in the index were: proxy by mail; the block of shares 
before  shareholders’  meetings;  cumulative  voting  or  proportional  representation; 
judicial avenues to challenge decisions of either management or the assembly, or the 
right to require the company to purchase their shares; pre-emptive rights, i.e. the right 
to buy new issues of stock;  right of shareholders holding a certain percentage of the 
share  capital  to  call  on  extraordinary  meeting98.  Nevertheless,  this  index  and  the 
related findings have been widely criticised by the subsequent literature, which has 
pointed out the ability of different legal systems to achieve comparable outcomes in 
terms of investors’ protection by using different instruments99,  the omission in the 
construction of the index of fundamental elements relating to corporate law on the 
whole,  which  elements  have  been  considered  in  constructing  a  new  shareholder 
protection index100, and the importance of the allocation of power in corporations101. 
On the basis of the enlarged team production approach, or in other words of the co-
associative model proposed in this work, it could be argued that a ‘refined’ investors’ 
96 L.Cerioni, ‘Corporate governance in the European Community: A (proposal for a) re-reading of the 
key defining elements in light of EC law, and the scope for a slightly “refined” definition’  available at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2438/1566 
97 COM (2006) 136 final, “Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs: making Europe a pole of 
excellence on corporate social responsibility”
98 R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes,  A. Sheifer, and R. Vishny,  Law and Finance, 106 J.Pol.Econ. 
1113 (1998) 
99 E.g.: U.C. Braendle, Shareholder protection in the USA and Germany: - “Law and Finance” 
Revisited, 2006 German Law Journal 257  
100 P.P.Lele, M.M.Siems, Shareholder protection, A Leximetric Approach, 2007 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies  17 
101 S. Cool, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of Powers, 2005 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 697  
protection index could include, in addition to the various shareholders’ rights, a new 
dimension.  This  new  dimension,  which  would  be  necessary  for  assessing  the 
safeguard of shareholders’  fundamental right, the right to future income - without 
which the aspects of protection identified by the literature just mentioned would be of 
limited  usefulness  -   would  be  given  by  the  degree  of  co-operation between the 
company and its stakeholders. This co-operation could in fact be seen as the best 
condition,  ex ante, for ensuring the goodwill and the shareholders’ rights to future 
income, and a greater degree of co-operation encouraged by the legal system and 
culture of co-operation could correspond to an higher ranking in this refined investors 
protection index. On this bases, comparative corporate governance research may use 
new benchmarks in assessing the quality of corporate governance systems and of the 
surrounding frameworks in several countries, both within the EC and outside the EC.  
      A fourth direction could bring corporate governance research at the intersection 
with the ‘global governance’ research, which explores the ways in which the actors, 
the institutions,  the processes  interact  to  ensure accountability  in  decision-making 
processes and global democracy. The literature on global governance, in pointing out 
that to a substantial and growing extent rule making directly affecting the freedom of 
actions of individuals and firms, as well as of nation states, is taking place in global 
settings created by states but no longer under their effective control, has addressed the 
question  of  what  happens  to  accountability  when  there  is  no  principal  and  no 
antecedent well defined standard102. It has found a reply whereby accountability in 
this  context  is  no  longer  a  matter  of  compliance  with  the  rule  set  down  by  the 
principal, but rather provisions of good reasons – offered by “agents” to each others – 
for choosing, in light of fresh knowledge, one way of advancing a common project, 
and has referred to this kind of dynamic accountability as ‘deliberative polyarchy’103. 
Deliberative polyarchy would be shaped by mutually re-enforcing moral and practical 
concerns, and the decision-making would work through mutual reason-giving, with 
the aim of finding solutions that others can reasonably be expected to support as well.
    The  convergence  between  this  global  governance  research  and  corporate 
governance research would be brought about by the enlarged team production model. 
This because an enlarged team production model working by means of a permanent 
dialogue  between  the  directors  of  corporations  and  the  committee  representing 
stakeholders  groups,  and  a  corporate  governance  legislative  framework  aimed  at 
encouraging the adoption of such a model by means of incentives, would bring about 
nexus  of  reciprocal  accountabilities:  accountability  of  the  company  towards  the 
representative committees, for taking their inputs into the decision-making process; 
accountability of the representative committees towards the company, for presenting 
to the company the real concerns of stakeholders; accountability of the representative 
committees towards the stakeholders, for presenting their concerns to the company; 
accountability of the company towards the regulator, for implementing the model (and 
thus  advancing  CSR  and  human  rights)  and  thus  for  “deserving”  the  incentives; 
accountability of the regulator (national, international, EU) towards the company and 
the stakeholders, for granting and maintaining the incentives. This accountability of 
agents towards each others is the precondition for directors’  ultimate accountability 
not towards someone in particular, but for a result which is in the common interest: 
once the nexus of reciprocal accountabilities, intended as mutual reason-giving, works 
well  and allows the building and maintaining of  long-term relationships based on 
102 J.Cohen and C. Sabel, 2006, Norms and Global Institution, Prepared for Princeton Global 
Governance Workshop, Princeton University, 16-18 April 2007. 
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transparency and trust, it makes possible the objective result (business survival and 
development under sound economic and financial conditions, thus the maintaining of 
the goodwill)  which is in the common interest,  and for which directors would be 
accountable.  
    Therefore,  the intersection between the corporate governance research and the 
global governance research could be as follows: the corporate governance research 
could  ‘borrow’  from the  global  governance  literature  the  concept  of  ‘deliberative 
cooperation’ to explore the most efficient and effective ways in which the nexus of 
mutual accountabilities can last over time, as it  needs to do in order to ensure the 
accountability of directors for a result (the survival and development of the business 
activity, thus the maintaining of the necessary contributions by stakeholders). In turn, 
the ‘global governance’ literature above indicated could find, in the interrelationships 
(between  shareholders,  directors,  committees  representatives  of  stakeholders  and 
national and/or supranational authorities granting incentives) that would be fostered 
by  a  corporate  governance  framework  inspired  by  the  enlarged  team  production 
approach, the settings to propose ‘deliberative polyarchy’ mechanisms.              
     
Conclusion
    The international  corporate  governance literature  has long been dominated by 
discussions concerning the separation between ownership and control, the issues of 
accountability of directors to shareholders, the dispute between the theories whereby 
companies are to be run in the interests of shareholders and the stakeholders’ theories, 
with  the  prevalence  of  the  former  over  the  latter,  and  the  identification  of  the 
corporate  objective  as  the  objective  established  by  shareholders  or  as  the 
maximization  of  shareholders’  wealth  or  of  the  “long-term  shareholders’  value”, 
which found their roots in the Anglo-Saxon context of corporations characterized by 
dispersed ownership. 
    Nevertheless, along with the aspects highlighted by the part of the Anglo-American 
literature  which  has  been  trying  to  shift  the  emphasis  away  from  the  classic 
shareholders  vs.  stakeholders  alternative,  this  work  has  suggested  that  the  best 
achievement of the long-term success of the company, which emerges as the ultimate 
goal from the OECD Principles in their 2004 version, and from the accompanying 
Methodology, would make it appropriate a new framework of the understanding of 
the operation of a successful company. This framework,  by drawing a  conceptual 
distinction between competing demands of the various constituencies and contrasting 
interests, identifies the interest of the company in the survival and development of the 
business  activity  under  sound  economic  and  financial  conditions,  and,  for  this 
purpose, it specifies that the most solid foundation to achieve this goal is the building 
of long-term relationships with all stakeholders groups, intended as groups of stable 
resource providers who are interested in getting continuous returns over time. The 
approach suggested to achieve this result, which result would minimise the general 
risk of withdrawal of stakeholders’ contributions which is incumbent on any business 
activity,  has  been  defined  in  terms  of  “enlarged  team production”  model  or  “co-
associative” model. It overcomes the classic distinction between shareholders’ models 
and  stakeholders’  model,  by  indicating  that  the  interests  of  any  constituency  are 
effectively protected as a consequence of the achievement of a result which concerns 
the business activity on its own, and which would be consistent with the increasingly 
global demand for a socially responsible business behaviour. 
    The co-associative model – as this work has attempted to demonstrate – would 
“pass” the test under a property rights perspective, and would bring a seemingly new 
dimension into the research theme involving multinational corporations and human 
rights, and the shape of a corporate governance framework based on this model would 
arguably be compatible with the wider international legal order as well as with EC 
law.  Consequently,  the  new  start  in  corporate  governance  research,  debates  and 
related legislative policy options advocated by this model, as well as the issues that it 
raises and that have been indicated as directions for future research,  would represent 
(maybe a difficult but) a major challenge at a time, such as the current one, when 
businesses behaviour and the global impact of their operations have become a world-
wide concern for preventing the market-based economic system for threatening its 
own long term sustainability. 
    
